Michael Schulz
This exercise will occur on Friday, May 28, 2010 from 10:15-12:00 in room 407.
The following directions are posted on the course portal:
Göteborg 2010-05-28
EXERCISE 5
RS2235, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 15 higher education credits
SPRING 2010
Is peace possible?
Make use of the book by Mahler et al. Also, if possible “google” on the net, and try to analyse the common grounds/bridges of different proposals in the conflict? Which one is closest in the sense that it builds common ground between the parties? Which is most difficult? How have the proposal dealt with the key issues of the conflict? Do you have any recommendations for improvement of a proposal you think has most potential, and in such case, what changes do you suggest? You will be divided into groups that discuss the arguments, and in the end of the seminar you will have a plenary discussion.
Good Luck!
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
Exercise #4: Oral Presentations
Michael Schulz
Oral presentations will be held on Monday, May 17, 2010 from 13:15-15:00 in room 325.
The following directions are posted on the course portal:
Göteborg 2010-05-12
EXERCISE 4
RS2235, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 15 higher education credits
SPRING 2010
Assignment (oral presentation)
The students shall individually and independently search for and compile information about a specific topic (chosen by the student) within the fields presented below. The work will be presented orally to the other students at the seminar on May 17, 13-15. The idea is to both develop the skills to search relevant scientific information and material concerning an issue linked to the “research-front”. You will be divided into groups and present for each other.
• Historical perspectives of the conflict
• The war of 1948-49, 1956, 1967, or 1973
• The Palestinization of the conflict
• Israeli and/or Palestinian societies
• Negotiations and conflict resolution attempts
• First and/or second intifadas
Good Luck!
Oral presentations will be held on Monday, May 17, 2010 from 13:15-15:00 in room 325.
The following directions are posted on the course portal:
Göteborg 2010-05-12
EXERCISE 4
RS2235, The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 15 higher education credits
SPRING 2010
Assignment (oral presentation)
The students shall individually and independently search for and compile information about a specific topic (chosen by the student) within the fields presented below. The work will be presented orally to the other students at the seminar on May 17, 13-15. The idea is to both develop the skills to search relevant scientific information and material concerning an issue linked to the “research-front”. You will be divided into groups and present for each other.
• Historical perspectives of the conflict
• The war of 1948-49, 1956, 1967, or 1973
• The Palestinization of the conflict
• Israeli and/or Palestinian societies
• Negotiations and conflict resolution attempts
• First and/or second intifadas
Good Luck!
Exercise #3: Israeli Society
This is what we came up with during the exercise...
Melting-pot
Unit of analysis:
Intra Jewish relations in Israel
Yes:
- Everyone has a say
- International view Israel as a unified Jewish community
No:
- No group is willing to make concessions to become more like other groups
- Extremely stratified, divisive; between Jews, excluding Arabs
- External actors
Pluralist
Unit of analysis:
Intra Jewish relations and Arab Jewish relations and secular-religious relations
Yes:
- Seems to represent the principle cleavages in Israeli society
- Distribution of power between ethnic groups
No:
- Intra Arab relations
- Gender
- External actors
Class/Ethnicity
Unit of analysis:
Intra Jewish relations in Israel between Ashkenazim and Oriental
- Economic-ideological
Yes:
- Economic Jewish structural divisions
- Ideological division (Ashkenazi more secular )
No:
- Internal divisions within these two groups as well
- Secular-religious division is now more important (unitary view of the communities) esp. settler movement
Jewish-Arab relations
- Economic political
- External actors
Yes:
- Economic Arab-Jewish institutional divisions
No:
- Unitary view of Arabs
- External actors
Multi-melting pot
Unit of analysis:
Israeli “ethnic” relations
Yes:
- Fills the ethnic “gaps”
- Address the globalization of culture
No:
- Leaves out religious relations
- External actors (Iraq, Iran, US)
Post-multi-melting pot (This is a theory our group created to address minor gaps in the Multi-melting pot theory.)
Unit of analysis: Israeli global-socio-political relations (including ethnicity, religion, gender, ideology, class relations, culture, etc.)
Yes: See above
No: See above
Melting-pot
Unit of analysis:
Intra Jewish relations in Israel
Yes:
- Everyone has a say
- International view Israel as a unified Jewish community
No:
- No group is willing to make concessions to become more like other groups
- Extremely stratified, divisive; between Jews, excluding Arabs
- External actors
Pluralist
Unit of analysis:
Intra Jewish relations and Arab Jewish relations and secular-religious relations
Yes:
- Seems to represent the principle cleavages in Israeli society
- Distribution of power between ethnic groups
No:
- Intra Arab relations
- Gender
- External actors
Class/Ethnicity
Unit of analysis:
Intra Jewish relations in Israel between Ashkenazim and Oriental
- Economic-ideological
Yes:
- Economic Jewish structural divisions
- Ideological division (Ashkenazi more secular )
No:
- Internal divisions within these two groups as well
- Secular-religious division is now more important (unitary view of the communities) esp. settler movement
Jewish-Arab relations
- Economic political
- External actors
Yes:
- Economic Arab-Jewish institutional divisions
No:
- Unitary view of Arabs
- External actors
Multi-melting pot
Unit of analysis:
Israeli “ethnic” relations
Yes:
- Fills the ethnic “gaps”
- Address the globalization of culture
No:
- Leaves out religious relations
- External actors (Iraq, Iran, US)
Post-multi-melting pot (This is a theory our group created to address minor gaps in the Multi-melting pot theory.)
Unit of analysis: Israeli global-socio-political relations (including ethnicity, religion, gender, ideology, class relations, culture, etc.)
Yes: See above
No: See above
Exercise #2: Prospects for Peace after 1967
This is what I prepared for the exercise...
What do we know about the Six Day/June War?
● Israel attacked first on June 5, 1967, attacking the Egyptian air force.
● Israel termed the attack “pre-emptive” in response to what they deemed an imminent
attack by Arab military forces including forces from Egypt, Syria, Jordan with less
substantial troop contributions from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria.
● Egypt had amassed more than 100,000 troops in the Sinai as well as expelled UN
peacekeepers and closed the Straits of Tiran prior to Israel’s attack.
● Syria’s army was amassed in the Golan Heights on their border with Israel.
● Jordan (reluctantly) amassed forces in the West Bank which they had occupied since 1948.
● Israel easily won the war in 6 days, claiming the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert (from
Egypt), the West Bank and Jerusalem (from Jordan), and the Golan Heights (from Syria).
● Israel latter “traded” the Sinai Desert “for peace” with Egypt but annexed the Golan
Heights and Jerusalem and continue to occupy the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—
though the occupation of the Gaza Strip is to a lesser degree than the occupation of the
West Bank.
● On September 1, 1967, the Arab League met in Khartoum, Sudan and passed the
Khartoum Resolution which stated “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no
negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own
country” (Article 3).
● Israel has long sided the Khartoum Resolution as evidence that there is no one of the
Arab side with which to negotiate.
● Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, broke with the Khartoum Resolution when he visited
Jerusalem (November 1977) and subsequently signed the Camp David Accords in 1978 which “traded land for peace”--- in this case, the Sinai Desert was returned to Egypt in exchange for peace with Israel. In addition, Israeli ships were granted passage through the Suez canal and the Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Taba—Rafah straits were recognized as
international waterways.
Was Israel ready for peace after 1967?--- Yes.
From Myths and Facts by Mitchell G. Bard, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mf7.html#e
MYTH
“After the 1967 war, Israel refused to negotiate a settlement with the Arabs.”
FACT
After its victory in the Six-Day War, Israel hoped the Arab states would enter peace negotiations. Israel signaled to the Arab states its willingness to relinquish virtually all the territories it acquired in exchange for peace. As Moshe Dayan put it, Jerusalem was waiting only for a telephone call from Arab leaders to start negotiations. But these hopes were dashed in August 1967 when Arab leaders meeting in Khartoum adopted a formula of three noes: "no peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel...." As former Israeli President Chaim Herzog wrote: "Israel's belief that the war had come to an end and that peace would now reign along the borders was soon dispelled. Three weeks after the conclusion of hostilities, the first major incident occurred on the Suez Canal."
Was Israel ready for peace after 1967?--- No.
From Elon, Amos (2002), “Israelis and Palestinians: What Went Wrong” The New York Times Review of Books, December 19, 2002, Accessed 14 April 2010, Available at http://www94.homepage.villanova.edu/peter.knapp/What%20went%20wrong.pdf.
● Israel immediately sought to settle, colonize and annex parts of the West Bank, the Gaza
Strip and the Golan Heights.
● Israel never had any intention of ceding the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for peace.
● Israel’s victory had humiliated Soviet allies, thus the U.S. was not interested in a peaceful
resolution of the conflict.
● Israel believed it held a far superior position to the Arab states and thus were determined
to hold their ground until the Arabs gave in.
● Israel was unwilling to cede any part of Jerusalem to Jordan in exchange for peace.
● According to Michael Ben Yair, Israel's attorney general in the Rabin government, “The
Six-Day War was forced on us; but the war's Seventh day, which began on June 12,
1967—continues to this day and is the product of our choice. We enthusiastically chose
to become a colonialist society, ignoring international treaties, expropriating lands,
transferring settlers from Israel to the occupied territories, engaging in theft and finding
justifications for all this.” (cited by Amos 2002: 13).
Were the Arab states ready for peace after 1967?--- Yes.
● King Hussein began negotiations with Israel in 1970 and was ready to trade peace if
“Israel withdrew from much of the West Bank as well as from East Jerusalem and if the
Muslim and Christian holy places in the Old City were restored to Jordan” (Amos 2002:
11).
● Egypt, Syria, and Jordan never received offers of peace from Israel that were supposed to by conveyed via the United States. According to these offers, Israel would return the Sinai Desert to Egypt, the Golan Heights to Syria, negotiate with Jordan over the Eastern
border in exchange for peace. (This is a highly controversial point.)
● Egypt and Jordan accepted UN Resolution 242 which called for Israeli withdrawal from
occupied territories in exchange for peace--- that is, recognition of the state of Israel and
an end to belligerency.
Were the Arab states ready for peace after 1967?--- No.
● Jews were persecuted and expelled from Arab states notably in Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon,
Tunisia, Morocco, and Iraq.
From Myths and Facts by Mitchell G. Bard, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mf7.html#e
MYTH
“The Arab states and the PLO accepted Resolution 242 whereas Israel rejected it.”
FACT
The Arab states have traditionally said they accepted 242 as defined by them, that is, as requiring Israel's total, unconditional withdrawal from the occupied territories.
In a statement to the General Assembly October 15, 1968, the PLO, rejecting Resolution 242, said "the implementation of said resolution will lead to the loss of every hope for the establishment of peace and security in Palestine and the Middle East region."
By contrast, Ambassador Abba Eban expressed Israel's position to the Security Council on May 1, 1968: "My government has indicated its acceptance of the Security Council resolution for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace. I am also authorized to reaffirm that we are willing to seek agreement with each Arab State on all matters included in that resolution." It took nearly a quarter century, but the PLO finally agreed that Resolutions 242 and 338 should be the basis for negotiations with Israel when it signed the Declaration of Principles in September 1993.
MYTH
“The Palestinians were willing to negotiate a settlement after the Six-Day War.”
FACT
The Arab League created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Cairo in 1964 as a weapon against Israel. Until the Six-Day War, the PLO engaged in terrorist attacks that contributed to the momentum toward conflict. Neither the PLO nor any other Palestinian groups campaigned for Jordan or Egypt to create an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. The focus of Palestinian activism was on the destruction of Israel. After the Arab states were defeated in 1967, the Palestinians did not alter their basic objective. With one million Arabs coming under Israeli rule, some Palestinians believed the prospect for waging a popular war of liberation had grown. Toward that end, Yasser Arafat instigated a campaign of terror from the West Bank. During September-December 1967, 61 attacks were launched, most against civilian targets such as factories, movie theaters and private homes. Israeli security forces gradually became more effective in thwarting terrorist plans inside Israel and the territories. Consequently, the PLO began to pursue a different strategy — attacking Jews and Israeli targets abroad. In early 1968, the first of many aircraft was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists.
What do we know about the Six Day/June War?
● Israel attacked first on June 5, 1967, attacking the Egyptian air force.
● Israel termed the attack “pre-emptive” in response to what they deemed an imminent
attack by Arab military forces including forces from Egypt, Syria, Jordan with less
substantial troop contributions from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria.
● Egypt had amassed more than 100,000 troops in the Sinai as well as expelled UN
peacekeepers and closed the Straits of Tiran prior to Israel’s attack.
● Syria’s army was amassed in the Golan Heights on their border with Israel.
● Jordan (reluctantly) amassed forces in the West Bank which they had occupied since 1948.
● Israel easily won the war in 6 days, claiming the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert (from
Egypt), the West Bank and Jerusalem (from Jordan), and the Golan Heights (from Syria).
● Israel latter “traded” the Sinai Desert “for peace” with Egypt but annexed the Golan
Heights and Jerusalem and continue to occupy the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—
though the occupation of the Gaza Strip is to a lesser degree than the occupation of the
West Bank.
● On September 1, 1967, the Arab League met in Khartoum, Sudan and passed the
Khartoum Resolution which stated “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no
negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own
country” (Article 3).
● Israel has long sided the Khartoum Resolution as evidence that there is no one of the
Arab side with which to negotiate.
● Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, broke with the Khartoum Resolution when he visited
Jerusalem (November 1977) and subsequently signed the Camp David Accords in 1978 which “traded land for peace”--- in this case, the Sinai Desert was returned to Egypt in exchange for peace with Israel. In addition, Israeli ships were granted passage through the Suez canal and the Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Taba—Rafah straits were recognized as
international waterways.
Was Israel ready for peace after 1967?--- Yes.
From Myths and Facts by Mitchell G. Bard, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mf7.html#e
MYTH
“After the 1967 war, Israel refused to negotiate a settlement with the Arabs.”
FACT
After its victory in the Six-Day War, Israel hoped the Arab states would enter peace negotiations. Israel signaled to the Arab states its willingness to relinquish virtually all the territories it acquired in exchange for peace. As Moshe Dayan put it, Jerusalem was waiting only for a telephone call from Arab leaders to start negotiations. But these hopes were dashed in August 1967 when Arab leaders meeting in Khartoum adopted a formula of three noes: "no peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel...." As former Israeli President Chaim Herzog wrote: "Israel's belief that the war had come to an end and that peace would now reign along the borders was soon dispelled. Three weeks after the conclusion of hostilities, the first major incident occurred on the Suez Canal."
Was Israel ready for peace after 1967?--- No.
From Elon, Amos (2002), “Israelis and Palestinians: What Went Wrong” The New York Times Review of Books, December 19, 2002, Accessed 14 April 2010, Available at http://www94.homepage.villanova.edu/peter.knapp/What%20went%20wrong.pdf.
● Israel immediately sought to settle, colonize and annex parts of the West Bank, the Gaza
Strip and the Golan Heights.
● Israel never had any intention of ceding the Gaza Strip and the West Bank for peace.
● Israel’s victory had humiliated Soviet allies, thus the U.S. was not interested in a peaceful
resolution of the conflict.
● Israel believed it held a far superior position to the Arab states and thus were determined
to hold their ground until the Arabs gave in.
● Israel was unwilling to cede any part of Jerusalem to Jordan in exchange for peace.
● According to Michael Ben Yair, Israel's attorney general in the Rabin government, “The
Six-Day War was forced on us; but the war's Seventh day, which began on June 12,
1967—continues to this day and is the product of our choice. We enthusiastically chose
to become a colonialist society, ignoring international treaties, expropriating lands,
transferring settlers from Israel to the occupied territories, engaging in theft and finding
justifications for all this.” (cited by Amos 2002: 13).
Were the Arab states ready for peace after 1967?--- Yes.
● King Hussein began negotiations with Israel in 1970 and was ready to trade peace if
“Israel withdrew from much of the West Bank as well as from East Jerusalem and if the
Muslim and Christian holy places in the Old City were restored to Jordan” (Amos 2002:
11).
● Egypt, Syria, and Jordan never received offers of peace from Israel that were supposed to by conveyed via the United States. According to these offers, Israel would return the Sinai Desert to Egypt, the Golan Heights to Syria, negotiate with Jordan over the Eastern
border in exchange for peace. (This is a highly controversial point.)
● Egypt and Jordan accepted UN Resolution 242 which called for Israeli withdrawal from
occupied territories in exchange for peace--- that is, recognition of the state of Israel and
an end to belligerency.
Were the Arab states ready for peace after 1967?--- No.
● Jews were persecuted and expelled from Arab states notably in Egypt, Yemen, Lebanon,
Tunisia, Morocco, and Iraq.
From Myths and Facts by Mitchell G. Bard, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/myths/mf7.html#e
MYTH
“The Arab states and the PLO accepted Resolution 242 whereas Israel rejected it.”
FACT
The Arab states have traditionally said they accepted 242 as defined by them, that is, as requiring Israel's total, unconditional withdrawal from the occupied territories.
In a statement to the General Assembly October 15, 1968, the PLO, rejecting Resolution 242, said "the implementation of said resolution will lead to the loss of every hope for the establishment of peace and security in Palestine and the Middle East region."
By contrast, Ambassador Abba Eban expressed Israel's position to the Security Council on May 1, 1968: "My government has indicated its acceptance of the Security Council resolution for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace. I am also authorized to reaffirm that we are willing to seek agreement with each Arab State on all matters included in that resolution." It took nearly a quarter century, but the PLO finally agreed that Resolutions 242 and 338 should be the basis for negotiations with Israel when it signed the Declaration of Principles in September 1993.
MYTH
“The Palestinians were willing to negotiate a settlement after the Six-Day War.”
FACT
The Arab League created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Cairo in 1964 as a weapon against Israel. Until the Six-Day War, the PLO engaged in terrorist attacks that contributed to the momentum toward conflict. Neither the PLO nor any other Palestinian groups campaigned for Jordan or Egypt to create an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. The focus of Palestinian activism was on the destruction of Israel. After the Arab states were defeated in 1967, the Palestinians did not alter their basic objective. With one million Arabs coming under Israeli rule, some Palestinians believed the prospect for waging a popular war of liberation had grown. Toward that end, Yasser Arafat instigated a campaign of terror from the West Bank. During September-December 1967, 61 attacks were launched, most against civilian targets such as factories, movie theaters and private homes. Israeli security forces gradually became more effective in thwarting terrorist plans inside Israel and the territories. Consequently, the PLO began to pursue a different strategy — attacking Jews and Israeli targets abroad. In early 1968, the first of many aircraft was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists.
Exercise #1: What are the Historical Facts?
This is what I prepared for the exercise...
Overarching Questions
● How can we judge the validity of historical accounts?
A. Can scientific conclusions be reached through analysis of declassified Israeli documents and little to no analysis of classified Arab documents?
B. Are eye-witness accounts trustworthy?
C. Is analysis based on primary or secondary source material?
D. Is there a boundary between historical writing and journalistic writing as claimed by Shapira?
● As social scientists, how should we critically evaluate each researcher’s contribution?
A. We should try to determine their political bias as well as whether they have analyzed and/or presented edited versions of historical documents. (Khalidi claims that the Kimche brothers only published excerpts of Plan D.) We should also attempt to replicate their conclusions through rigorous analysis. (A scientific conclusion is not valid unless it can be replicated.)
Palestinian Refugees
● What do historians claim to be the cause of the Palestinian refugee problem?
A. Arab evacuation orders
B. Systematic ethnic cleansing via Plan Daled
C. Israeli initiated whisper campaign
D. The Dar Yassin massacre (April 1948)
E. Israeli evacuation broadcasts
F. Collusion between Israel and Trans-Jordan
● Where do the historians disagree/ agree?
Areas of disagreement:
A. The occurrence and/or significance of Arab evacuation orders
a. Jon and David Kimche: the Arabs issued evacuation orders to ethnic Arabs so that they could “push the Jews into the sea.”
b. Walid Khalidi: Arab evacuation orders are a ‘red herring’ (Khalidi, 1988:5).
c. Morris: There is no evidence of evacuation orders.
d. According to Khalidi, Morris does not recognize the connection between the “expulsion” of the Arab population and Plan Daled (Khalidi, 1988:5).
e. According to Khalidi, Morris contends that fleeing Palestinians “brought permanent exile upon themselves” (Khalidi, 1988:6).
f. According to Khalidi, Morris argues that the expulsion of the Arab population and the destruction of “abandoned” villages was not planned by the Israeli government but extemporaneous. (Khalidi, 1988:6).
g. Khalidi claims that there is no evidence of Arab evacuation orders in the back files of the British (BBC) and American monitoring stations in the Near East (Khalidi, 1988:6).
h. Upon scrutinizing the BBC monitoring station back files, Khalidi found that “not only was there no hint of any Arab evacuation order, but the Arab radio stations had urged the Palestinians to hold on and be steadfast whereas it was the Jewish radio stations of the Haganah and the Irgun and Stern Gang which had been engaged in incessant and strident psychological warfare against the Arab civilian population” (Khalidi, 1988:6).
i. Childers reached the same conclusion (above) about the lack of Arab evacuation orders (Khalidi, 1988:6).
j. Arab war aims (Shlaim 1995:299).
B. The defensive/ offensive nature of Plan Daled
C. Planned ethnic cleansing
Areas of agreement:
A. Palestinians did flee en mass during the War of 1948.
B. Plan Daled exists.
C. All of the Arab states, except Jordan, rejected the U.N. Partition Plan (Shlaim 1995:299).
D. Seven Arab armies invaded Palestine on May 15, 1948 (Shlaim 1995:299).
Plan Daled
● What do we know about Plan Daled?
A. It was written by the Jewish underground army, the Hagannah, the predecessor of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in 1947.
B. The plan was revised in December 1947 and March 1948.
C. It was drafted as a “defensive” plan to ward off Arab invasion into “the borders of the Hebrew state” (Assignment of Duties, (f) ).
D. It contained language that authorized the “destruction of (Arab) villages…especially those population centers which are difficult to control continuously.”
E. It prescribed actions “in the event of resistance” including the “destruction of villages” and the expulsion of the Arab population “outside the borders of the state” (Assignment of Duties, (b) 4).
F. Plan Daled also stated that “enemy cities” must be besieged through attack of transportation arteries and the disruption of “vital services, such as electricity, water, and fuel…” (Assignment of Duties, (e) 1 and 3).
● How is Plan Daled related to the Palestinianization of the conflict?
A. Plan Daled has been interpreted as a plan of ethnic cleansing.
B. Plan Daled has also been interpreted as targeting civilians.
● How is Plan Daled related to Israeli and/or Palestinian societies?
Israeli society
A. Khalidi claims “that the Zionist emphasis on Arab evacuation orders is in fact a skillful propaganda tactic with manifold purposes: it shifts the moral responsibility for the refugees on the Arabs themselves, puts them on the defensive, and shoulders them with the burden of refutation. Above all it directs the attention from the primary of the derivative: from the actual course of events in 1948 in Palestine to the realm of patience-consuming allegation and counter-allegation” (Khalidi, 1988:9).
B. Also according to Khalidi, “the ideological premises of Plan D are to be found in the very concept of Zionism” (Khalidi, 1988:9). That is, Zionists were in search of a land that they could call their own. If the Zionists had to dispel the indigenous population of the land they sought, it was a lesser even that perpetuation of the Jewish problem (Khalidi, 1988:9). Herzl, one of the founding fathers of Zionism, supported the expulsion of the indigenous population of land claimed for the Jews.
C. Land was needed to accommodate large scale Jewish immigration to the newly established stated of Israel (Khalidi, 1988:12-13).
Palestinian society
A. Plan D reinforces the premise that the Zionists intended to create a Jewish majority in Palestine via the transfer of ethnic Arab inhabitants.
B. Plan D is evidence of the Zionists’ master plan.
● How is Plan Daled related to negotiations and conflict resolution attempts?
A. The Palestinian “right of return” is one of the biggest obstacles to the creation of a lasting peace.
B. The Palestinians claim an unconditional “right of return” while Israelis are unwilling to allow for the return of the Palestinian population because Arabs would then constitute the ethnic majority in Israel.
● How is Plan Daled related to the first and/or second intifadas?
Plan C
“K (3). The operations mentioned in 1 above will be carried out by damaging the service stations along that route, or by sabotaging its vehicles, or by stopping one or more vehicles on the road, evacuating the passengers, and destroying them.”
“Q. Propaganda will have a large effect on the extent to which incidents are publicized and on the deterrent value this will have on the Arab masses. Therefore, an extensive propaganda network must be organized by the following means:
1. Radio.
2. Leaflets.
3. Whispering campaigns diffused by Arabs or Arabists.
Each of our countermeasures should be widely publicized and reverberate in every Arab village.”
Overarching Questions
● How can we judge the validity of historical accounts?
A. Can scientific conclusions be reached through analysis of declassified Israeli documents and little to no analysis of classified Arab documents?
B. Are eye-witness accounts trustworthy?
C. Is analysis based on primary or secondary source material?
D. Is there a boundary between historical writing and journalistic writing as claimed by Shapira?
● As social scientists, how should we critically evaluate each researcher’s contribution?
A. We should try to determine their political bias as well as whether they have analyzed and/or presented edited versions of historical documents. (Khalidi claims that the Kimche brothers only published excerpts of Plan D.) We should also attempt to replicate their conclusions through rigorous analysis. (A scientific conclusion is not valid unless it can be replicated.)
Palestinian Refugees
● What do historians claim to be the cause of the Palestinian refugee problem?
A. Arab evacuation orders
B. Systematic ethnic cleansing via Plan Daled
C. Israeli initiated whisper campaign
D. The Dar Yassin massacre (April 1948)
E. Israeli evacuation broadcasts
F. Collusion between Israel and Trans-Jordan
● Where do the historians disagree/ agree?
Areas of disagreement:
A. The occurrence and/or significance of Arab evacuation orders
a. Jon and David Kimche: the Arabs issued evacuation orders to ethnic Arabs so that they could “push the Jews into the sea.”
b. Walid Khalidi: Arab evacuation orders are a ‘red herring’ (Khalidi, 1988:5).
c. Morris: There is no evidence of evacuation orders.
d. According to Khalidi, Morris does not recognize the connection between the “expulsion” of the Arab population and Plan Daled (Khalidi, 1988:5).
e. According to Khalidi, Morris contends that fleeing Palestinians “brought permanent exile upon themselves” (Khalidi, 1988:6).
f. According to Khalidi, Morris argues that the expulsion of the Arab population and the destruction of “abandoned” villages was not planned by the Israeli government but extemporaneous. (Khalidi, 1988:6).
g. Khalidi claims that there is no evidence of Arab evacuation orders in the back files of the British (BBC) and American monitoring stations in the Near East (Khalidi, 1988:6).
h. Upon scrutinizing the BBC monitoring station back files, Khalidi found that “not only was there no hint of any Arab evacuation order, but the Arab radio stations had urged the Palestinians to hold on and be steadfast whereas it was the Jewish radio stations of the Haganah and the Irgun and Stern Gang which had been engaged in incessant and strident psychological warfare against the Arab civilian population” (Khalidi, 1988:6).
i. Childers reached the same conclusion (above) about the lack of Arab evacuation orders (Khalidi, 1988:6).
j. Arab war aims (Shlaim 1995:299).
B. The defensive/ offensive nature of Plan Daled
C. Planned ethnic cleansing
Areas of agreement:
A. Palestinians did flee en mass during the War of 1948.
B. Plan Daled exists.
C. All of the Arab states, except Jordan, rejected the U.N. Partition Plan (Shlaim 1995:299).
D. Seven Arab armies invaded Palestine on May 15, 1948 (Shlaim 1995:299).
Plan Daled
● What do we know about Plan Daled?
A. It was written by the Jewish underground army, the Hagannah, the predecessor of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in 1947.
B. The plan was revised in December 1947 and March 1948.
C. It was drafted as a “defensive” plan to ward off Arab invasion into “the borders of the Hebrew state” (Assignment of Duties, (f) ).
D. It contained language that authorized the “destruction of (Arab) villages…especially those population centers which are difficult to control continuously.”
E. It prescribed actions “in the event of resistance” including the “destruction of villages” and the expulsion of the Arab population “outside the borders of the state” (Assignment of Duties, (b) 4).
F. Plan Daled also stated that “enemy cities” must be besieged through attack of transportation arteries and the disruption of “vital services, such as electricity, water, and fuel…” (Assignment of Duties, (e) 1 and 3).
● How is Plan Daled related to the Palestinianization of the conflict?
A. Plan Daled has been interpreted as a plan of ethnic cleansing.
B. Plan Daled has also been interpreted as targeting civilians.
● How is Plan Daled related to Israeli and/or Palestinian societies?
Israeli society
A. Khalidi claims “that the Zionist emphasis on Arab evacuation orders is in fact a skillful propaganda tactic with manifold purposes: it shifts the moral responsibility for the refugees on the Arabs themselves, puts them on the defensive, and shoulders them with the burden of refutation. Above all it directs the attention from the primary of the derivative: from the actual course of events in 1948 in Palestine to the realm of patience-consuming allegation and counter-allegation” (Khalidi, 1988:9).
B. Also according to Khalidi, “the ideological premises of Plan D are to be found in the very concept of Zionism” (Khalidi, 1988:9). That is, Zionists were in search of a land that they could call their own. If the Zionists had to dispel the indigenous population of the land they sought, it was a lesser even that perpetuation of the Jewish problem (Khalidi, 1988:9). Herzl, one of the founding fathers of Zionism, supported the expulsion of the indigenous population of land claimed for the Jews.
C. Land was needed to accommodate large scale Jewish immigration to the newly established stated of Israel (Khalidi, 1988:12-13).
Palestinian society
A. Plan D reinforces the premise that the Zionists intended to create a Jewish majority in Palestine via the transfer of ethnic Arab inhabitants.
B. Plan D is evidence of the Zionists’ master plan.
● How is Plan Daled related to negotiations and conflict resolution attempts?
A. The Palestinian “right of return” is one of the biggest obstacles to the creation of a lasting peace.
B. The Palestinians claim an unconditional “right of return” while Israelis are unwilling to allow for the return of the Palestinian population because Arabs would then constitute the ethnic majority in Israel.
● How is Plan Daled related to the first and/or second intifadas?
Plan C
“K (3). The operations mentioned in 1 above will be carried out by damaging the service stations along that route, or by sabotaging its vehicles, or by stopping one or more vehicles on the road, evacuating the passengers, and destroying them.”
“Q. Propaganda will have a large effect on the extent to which incidents are publicized and on the deterrent value this will have on the Arab masses. Therefore, an extensive propaganda network must be organized by the following means:
1. Radio.
2. Leaflets.
3. Whispering campaigns diffused by Arabs or Arabists.
Each of our countermeasures should be widely publicized and reverberate in every Arab village.”
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Lecture #14: Renewed Violence and Missed Opportunities
Michael Schulz
The following notes are based on a powerpoint presentation. I assume the presentation will be posted at http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
in the near future.
Negotiations Preceding and During the Al Aqsa Intifada
The al Aqsa intifada erupted in September 2000. But even as the bloodiest of two popular uprisings continued to claim lives on the streets of Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank, peace agreements were sought by top level officials.
Camp David, 2000
- After approximately one hundred years of conflict, this was the first time top level leaders met to discuss key issues.
-Arafat was blamed for the breakdown of negotiations.
Taba
- At this point, there was little to no public support for a peace treaty.
- Barak withdraws from negotitations because his mandate is coming to an end.
- The Israeli public wanted the government to get tough on the occupied territories and thus elected Sharon.
The Conflict Escalates
- The conflict reached a level of violence not experienced since the 1930s.
- All Palestinian groups participated in the al Aqsa intifada.
- Some viewed the uprising as a criticism of the PLO.
Israel and Southern Lebanon
- Israel unilaterally withdraws from southern Lebanon in 2000 and Hezbollah takes over.
- Hezbollah emerged during Israel's war with Lebanon (1982-1985).
- Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 is viewed as a humilitation in Israeli society.
Oslo II, 1995
- Areas A, B, and C established
- More and more checkpoints
- Palestinian movement is severely limited.
- As a result, Hamas initiates suicide attacks
Israel's Response to the al Aqsa Intitifada
- The al Aqsa intifada is marked by increasing confrontration.
- Israel pressures Arafat to control all Palestinian groups including terrorists.
- Israel initiates the "security wall".
● This was previously unthinkable.
● The goal was to isolate Arafat and stop suicide bombers.
The Process After 2001
- Arafat put under house arrest in Ramallah.
- Israel invades the West Bank.
- In August 2005, Israel withdraws unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and evacuates all settlers.
- Sharon views Araft as the "big problem" and a primarily obstacle toward resolution of the conflict.
- In 2002, the Arab League offers Israel a peace plan.
● This peace plan was initiated by the King of Saudi Arabia.
● Israel almost completely ignored the proposal.
- U.S. President George W. Bush endorses a two state solution.
● This is significant because no previous U.S. president had done so.
● Although there was global support for a two state solution after Oslo, Rabin never stated that the Oslo Peace Process would result in a two state solution. However, a majority of Israelis believed this would be the outcome.
- Hamas initiates a cease-fire agreement to end the al Aqsa intifada.
- In November 2004, Arafat dies and this transforms the situation on both sides.
- In January 2005, Abbas becomes President as well as chairman of Fatah and the PLO.
- Abbas did not want Hamas to join the PLO.
- Palestinian municipal elections are held in 2005.
● Hamas participates and de facto recognizes the Oslo Peace Process.
- National elections are held in January 2005 and Hamas wins a majority of seats.
● Hamas' platform is change and reform.
● The West boycotts Hamas.
● Israeli society is shocked by the election of a "terrorist" organization.
● The Israeli left feels betrayed and disappointed.
● This was a turning point in Palestinian democratic development.But, unfortunately, Fatah could not accept the results of the election and a Fatah Hamas power struggle ensued.
● Hamas forms a government and even considers acknowledging Israel's right to exist. However, Hamas efforts were stymied by international isolation and condemnation.
- Violence continues to escalate until the Saudi's come into the picture in Spring 2007.
● This was a great oppotunity but was, ultimately, yet another missed opportunity.
● A joint government was briefly formed in Gaza and the West Bank but, soon, negotiations broke down and intra-Palestinian violence escalated.
● As a result, two governments emerge with Fatah controling the West Bank and Hamas in charge of the Gaza Strip.
● An internal rift between Fatah and Hamas persists to this day.
- The Separation Fence in April 2007
● The fence made Israelis feel more secure and less vulnerable to suicide attacks while it made Palestinians feel more isolated.
● The fence creates a lot of problems for Palestinian society. Students are separated from schools, families are separated from eachother, farmers are separated from their lands, etc.
- Paradox: It is becoming increasingly difficult for people to meet but Track I negotiations continue to occur.
Hamas
- Ahmad Yasin (1936-2004) is viewed as the founder of the movement.
- Yasin is assassinated in 2004 along with many other top Hamas leaders.
- Hamas is comprised of a social branch, a military branch, and an intelligence section.
- The political structure is democratic with a Shura council.
- The identity of Hamas leaders is often veiled in secrecy however, Khaled Mishal is known to have served as the chair.
- Within the political structure there is an increasing rift between insiders residing in Gaza and outsiders. There is also a rift between hardliners and moderates.
- Hamas doesn't see democracy as conflicting with Islam.
● This illustrates how democracy is a global phenomenon with diverse local interpretations and forms of implementation.
- Hamas' 1988 charter is often quoted as evidence of the group's violent intents.
- Article 9 and 10
● "The rights of our people" are paramount but signed agreement can be honored.
- In 2007, Hamas states that they agree with the Beirut Position from 2002 which means that they are prepared to make a truce with Israel in exchange for land. However, many Israelis believe this is merely a tactical move rather than a genuine gesture toward peace.
The Gaza War (December 27, 2008- January 19, 2009)
- Violence erupts after Hamas takes control of the Gaza Strip in 2007.
- In September 2007, Israel declares Gaza as a war zone and initiates a naval blockade.
- A truce is declared but ends on December 18, 2008. This is when Hamas starts to fire Qassem rockets into southern Israel.
● As a result, Israel invades and launches a major military operation called Operation Cast Lead.
- Internationally, fear mounts that Syria, Hezbollah, and Jordan might enter the war.
- Hamas may have won the war "militarily" but many Palestinians blame them for heavy causalties suffered during the conflict.
Potentials for Peace
- The Olmert Plan: land swaps to accomodate Israeli settlements. This plan is acceptable to most Palestinians.
- Even the division of the Old City of Jerusalem has gained support within Palestinian society.
- Paradox: While more and more technical solutions are being proposed, peace remains ellusive
- Today, both sides continue to distrust eachother.
- Continued disagreements persist between Fatah and Hamas which is disappointing to many Palestinians some of whom do not support either party.
- Hamas is not against non-violence per se but finds it an inefficient method.
- "The Third Wave" is a Palestinian group that supports secular, non-violent resistance and is gaining support.
- The most complicated issue that is still unresolved is "The Right of Return".
● Although there was a figure on the table at Camp David, it was not accepted by Arafat.
- Although most Palestinians view "The Right of Return" as individual right, if Fatah and Hamas work together on this issue a compromise could be reached.
- Schulz contends that the refugee issue should be tabled until other, less controversial issues are resolved beginning with Jerusalem.
- There is a global consensus on a two state solution and peace principles but a deal has not been reached and civil society is becoming increasingly radicalized.
- Possible avenues for peace include:
● civil society
● Track II negotiations (Of course, this is difficult because the EU and the US have labeled Hamas as a terroritst organization.)
***It is important to note that Fatah never abadoned the use of violence. So, in this respect, there is no philosophical difference between Fatah and Hamas.***
The following notes are based on a powerpoint presentation. I assume the presentation will be posted at http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
in the near future.
Negotiations Preceding and During the Al Aqsa Intifada
The al Aqsa intifada erupted in September 2000. But even as the bloodiest of two popular uprisings continued to claim lives on the streets of Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank, peace agreements were sought by top level officials.
Camp David, 2000
- After approximately one hundred years of conflict, this was the first time top level leaders met to discuss key issues.
-Arafat was blamed for the breakdown of negotiations.
Taba
- At this point, there was little to no public support for a peace treaty.
- Barak withdraws from negotitations because his mandate is coming to an end.
- The Israeli public wanted the government to get tough on the occupied territories and thus elected Sharon.
The Conflict Escalates
- The conflict reached a level of violence not experienced since the 1930s.
- All Palestinian groups participated in the al Aqsa intifada.
- Some viewed the uprising as a criticism of the PLO.
Israel and Southern Lebanon
- Israel unilaterally withdraws from southern Lebanon in 2000 and Hezbollah takes over.
- Hezbollah emerged during Israel's war with Lebanon (1982-1985).
- Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 is viewed as a humilitation in Israeli society.
Oslo II, 1995
- Areas A, B, and C established
- More and more checkpoints
- Palestinian movement is severely limited.
- As a result, Hamas initiates suicide attacks
Israel's Response to the al Aqsa Intitifada
- The al Aqsa intifada is marked by increasing confrontration.
- Israel pressures Arafat to control all Palestinian groups including terrorists.
- Israel initiates the "security wall".
● This was previously unthinkable.
● The goal was to isolate Arafat and stop suicide bombers.
The Process After 2001
- Arafat put under house arrest in Ramallah.
- Israel invades the West Bank.
- In August 2005, Israel withdraws unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and evacuates all settlers.
- Sharon views Araft as the "big problem" and a primarily obstacle toward resolution of the conflict.
- In 2002, the Arab League offers Israel a peace plan.
● This peace plan was initiated by the King of Saudi Arabia.
● Israel almost completely ignored the proposal.
- U.S. President George W. Bush endorses a two state solution.
● This is significant because no previous U.S. president had done so.
● Although there was global support for a two state solution after Oslo, Rabin never stated that the Oslo Peace Process would result in a two state solution. However, a majority of Israelis believed this would be the outcome.
- Hamas initiates a cease-fire agreement to end the al Aqsa intifada.
- In November 2004, Arafat dies and this transforms the situation on both sides.
- In January 2005, Abbas becomes President as well as chairman of Fatah and the PLO.
- Abbas did not want Hamas to join the PLO.
- Palestinian municipal elections are held in 2005.
● Hamas participates and de facto recognizes the Oslo Peace Process.
- National elections are held in January 2005 and Hamas wins a majority of seats.
● Hamas' platform is change and reform.
● The West boycotts Hamas.
● Israeli society is shocked by the election of a "terrorist" organization.
● The Israeli left feels betrayed and disappointed.
● This was a turning point in Palestinian democratic development.But, unfortunately, Fatah could not accept the results of the election and a Fatah Hamas power struggle ensued.
● Hamas forms a government and even considers acknowledging Israel's right to exist. However, Hamas efforts were stymied by international isolation and condemnation.
- Violence continues to escalate until the Saudi's come into the picture in Spring 2007.
● This was a great oppotunity but was, ultimately, yet another missed opportunity.
● A joint government was briefly formed in Gaza and the West Bank but, soon, negotiations broke down and intra-Palestinian violence escalated.
● As a result, two governments emerge with Fatah controling the West Bank and Hamas in charge of the Gaza Strip.
● An internal rift between Fatah and Hamas persists to this day.
- The Separation Fence in April 2007
● The fence made Israelis feel more secure and less vulnerable to suicide attacks while it made Palestinians feel more isolated.
● The fence creates a lot of problems for Palestinian society. Students are separated from schools, families are separated from eachother, farmers are separated from their lands, etc.
- Paradox: It is becoming increasingly difficult for people to meet but Track I negotiations continue to occur.
Hamas
- Ahmad Yasin (1936-2004) is viewed as the founder of the movement.
- Yasin is assassinated in 2004 along with many other top Hamas leaders.
- Hamas is comprised of a social branch, a military branch, and an intelligence section.
- The political structure is democratic with a Shura council.
- The identity of Hamas leaders is often veiled in secrecy however, Khaled Mishal is known to have served as the chair.
- Within the political structure there is an increasing rift between insiders residing in Gaza and outsiders. There is also a rift between hardliners and moderates.
- Hamas doesn't see democracy as conflicting with Islam.
● This illustrates how democracy is a global phenomenon with diverse local interpretations and forms of implementation.
- Hamas' 1988 charter is often quoted as evidence of the group's violent intents.
- Article 9 and 10
● "The rights of our people" are paramount but signed agreement can be honored.
- In 2007, Hamas states that they agree with the Beirut Position from 2002 which means that they are prepared to make a truce with Israel in exchange for land. However, many Israelis believe this is merely a tactical move rather than a genuine gesture toward peace.
The Gaza War (December 27, 2008- January 19, 2009)
- Violence erupts after Hamas takes control of the Gaza Strip in 2007.
- In September 2007, Israel declares Gaza as a war zone and initiates a naval blockade.
- A truce is declared but ends on December 18, 2008. This is when Hamas starts to fire Qassem rockets into southern Israel.
● As a result, Israel invades and launches a major military operation called Operation Cast Lead.
- Internationally, fear mounts that Syria, Hezbollah, and Jordan might enter the war.
- Hamas may have won the war "militarily" but many Palestinians blame them for heavy causalties suffered during the conflict.
Potentials for Peace
- The Olmert Plan: land swaps to accomodate Israeli settlements. This plan is acceptable to most Palestinians.
- Even the division of the Old City of Jerusalem has gained support within Palestinian society.
- Paradox: While more and more technical solutions are being proposed, peace remains ellusive
- Today, both sides continue to distrust eachother.
- Continued disagreements persist between Fatah and Hamas which is disappointing to many Palestinians some of whom do not support either party.
- Hamas is not against non-violence per se but finds it an inefficient method.
- "The Third Wave" is a Palestinian group that supports secular, non-violent resistance and is gaining support.
- The most complicated issue that is still unresolved is "The Right of Return".
● Although there was a figure on the table at Camp David, it was not accepted by Arafat.
- Although most Palestinians view "The Right of Return" as individual right, if Fatah and Hamas work together on this issue a compromise could be reached.
- Schulz contends that the refugee issue should be tabled until other, less controversial issues are resolved beginning with Jerusalem.
- There is a global consensus on a two state solution and peace principles but a deal has not been reached and civil society is becoming increasingly radicalized.
- Possible avenues for peace include:
● civil society
● Track II negotiations (Of course, this is difficult because the EU and the US have labeled Hamas as a terroritst organization.)
***It is important to note that Fatah never abadoned the use of violence. So, in this respect, there is no philosophical difference between Fatah and Hamas.***
Friday, April 16, 2010
Lecture #13: The Use and Meaning of Violence
Nina Gren, Social Anthropology
Please see powerpoint posted entitled, "MAViolence2010Isr-Pal.pdf" posted at:
http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
Please see powerpoint posted entitled, "MAViolence2010Isr-Pal.pdf" posted at:
http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
Lecture #12: Negotiations: from 1990-2002
Michael Schulz
Please see powerpoint posted at:
http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
Opening Note
- In previous lectures, we discussed the first intifada and its impact on society and desires for peace.
- Today, we will begin with the 1990s when parties were closest to peace.
- Today, we will also lift forward some Track II concepts and take about why parties have lost faith in the Track II approach.
1990-1991
- The Cold War was over and a new geopolitical order emerged.
- The Gulf War
- 1991, Madrid Conference
● Bilateral talks occur per the wishes of the Israeli government with the goal of finding a political solution.
● Multilateral talks occur per the wishes of the Arab governments with the goal of discussing major issues including the refugee problem, water, etc. These issues concerned all parties.
● Israel, Likud government: "Facts on the ground"
● Shamir: I will negotiate toughly and pursue "facts on the ground"
● Unfortunately, Shamir was not ready for peace and was, at best, willing to give Palestinians limited autonmy which he and Rabin has offered Palestinians in 1989.
● The concept of "Gaza First" was first presented at the Madrid Conference. Gaza was a big problem for the Israelis due to its high population density, it was the place that the first intifada erupted, it had/ has high unemployment, and Israel was dependent upon day labor from its residents.
● Ultimately, the negotiated were stalled and no Israeli-Palestinian deal was reached.
The Early 1990s
- Shamir wanted to build settlements in the West Bank to accomodate immigrants from the former USSR.
- However, these immigrants were not willing to live in a conflict zone.
- The US repsonded critically to plans for further settlement.
- In 1992, the election went to Rabin.
- In 1992, Rabin had a direct confrontation with Hamas (a newly emerging political force)
● A young Israeli girl was killed.
● Rabin sent Hamas leaders to southern Lebanon.
● Sending leaders to southern Lebanon was a grave error because Hamas leaders were trained in suicide bombing techniques by Hezbollah.
- After his election, Rabin pursued peace with Syria.
● Rabin asked a US mediator to offer Syria the Golan Heights but it didn't work due to a miscommunication. As a result, Israel did not believe that the US was a serious broker.
- Rabin also pursued negotiations with Palestinians.
Oslo Negotiations
- These negotiations were conducted in secret on a small scale with Track II participants.
- One of the principle aims was the breakdown of enemy images.
- Gaza First was proposed at the beginning of negotiations.
- Rabin did not know about Oslo.
● He was initially furious when he learned about the secret negotiations but he soon realized that it was the only viable track left.
Oslo, Declaration of Principles
- Symbolic recognition
- Self-rule during the interim period
- Time schedule of five years with 1999 as the deadline for a final peace agreement
- Difficult issues (such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security, borders, etc.) should be solved later.
-Arafat made too many demands, stifling the process.
- However, both sides agreed to recognize each other as enemies which was significant.
Gaza/ Jeriko "First"
- Gaza/ Jeriko "first", May 1994
- Limited self rule of people not land
- Some sectors
- Palestinian Authority established
- Arafat and the PLO to Gaza, July 1994
- Palestinians allowed to establish a police force which was not a military but resembled one.
The Process
- There was strong grassroots support on both sides.
- But there was also strong and loud opposition/ religious inspired nationalists.
- Hebron Massacre, February 1994
- Hamas "Martyrs", April 1994
● Hamas attacks Israeli civilians for the first time.
- Continued opposition/ violent spoilers
- The mood among negotiators was collegial.
1995, Peace Agreement between Israel and Jordan
- Warm peace
- Still exists
Oslo II, 1995
- This agreement was drafted (signed?) on September 24, 1995.
- The agreement stipulated expanded self-rule for cities in the West Bank.
- As a result of the agreement, most Palestinians came under a different kind of rule.
● The West Bank was divided into Area A (Palestinian cities), Area B (Palestinian villages), and Aread C (Israeli settlement, military areas, and state lands).
- Rabin us assassinated by a right-wing religious extremist.
● He is killed after a peace rally in Tel Aviv.
● Israel is shocked because an Israeli should not kill another Israeli.
- The PLO holds elections in the West Bank in 1996
● International observers thought that the elections were relatively free and fair.
● Arafat won a landslide victory for President, receiving approximately 90% of the vote.
- This was a time period when there was support and euphoria about the peace process.
● Something like 70% of Israelis supported the peace process.
1996, Changing Winds
- Ayash killed by Israel followed by Hamas wave of "martyrs".
- Israeli elections
- Netanyahu elected Prime Minister, advocating peace and security
- Cold peace
- Increased violence
- In September 1996, relations deteriorate.
- Settlement activities
- Palestinian mobility decreases as Israel responds to terrorist attacks by closing points of entry.
- Netanyahu pressures Arafat to control Hamas
1997-2000
- 1997, Hebron
● Netanyahu wanted to renegotiate the Hebron Agreement.
- 1998, Wye River Agreement
● Minor changes to Oslo II
● Increased expansion of settlements
● Trust between parties deteriorates further
- 1997, first debate about corruption in the Palestinian government
- 1999, Labor returns to power in Israel
● Barak becomes Prime Minister
● Netanyahu admits to making mistakes which was a brilliant political move on his part and allowed him to return politics later.
● Barak promises peace within one year
● Barak intiates peace agreement with Syria but no agreement is reached.
- 2000, Camp David (II)
● Barak refuses to meet Arafat and Clinton accepts this.
● Clinton was ill-prepared and had to rely on his advisors.
● Parties spoke about key issues including Jerusalem and settlements.
● Barak offers approximately 94% of the West Bank to Palestinians including 90% of East Jerusalem. Unfortunately, this deal was only offered verbally and was later withdrawn.
● Negotiations broke down and Israelis and Palestinians were furious.
- The al-Aqsa intifada breaks out
● Confrontations occur all over the West Bank and Gaza.
● It is the most violent period to date.
Taba
- Egyptian and Jordanian leaders present.
- Lack of grassroots support on both sides
- A political solution was on the table but could not be signed.
- This was a very complicated period.
- There was increasingly a global consensus on a two state solution.
- George W. Bush accepts a two state solution which is significant because no other president and had done so.
2002, Roadmap to Peace
- Accepted by the UN Security Council
- Leaders from both sides (Palestine and Israel) were pressured to accept
- Track I approach (top-down)
● This is probably why it has not succeeded thus far.
Lingering Questions
- Are approximately 5,000 violent, radical Israeli settlers holding the peace process hostage?
- Can land swaps compensate for areas annexed by Israeli settlers?
- What will be the fate of holy sites?
- Is there a Palestinian right to return?
● Should Palestinians be allowed to return to Israel proper?
● Should those that do not or cannot return be compensated?
● Who is responsible for refugees?
- Can Track II negotiations work?
- Likewise, can secret meetings work?
- Will Israel accept a two state solution?
- How can Israel solve the paradox between the Jewish and democratic nature of the state of Israel while allowing for the return of Palestinian refugees?
- Is a two state solution a step toward a single state?
Please see powerpoint posted at:
http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
Opening Note
- In previous lectures, we discussed the first intifada and its impact on society and desires for peace.
- Today, we will begin with the 1990s when parties were closest to peace.
- Today, we will also lift forward some Track II concepts and take about why parties have lost faith in the Track II approach.
1990-1991
- The Cold War was over and a new geopolitical order emerged.
- The Gulf War
- 1991, Madrid Conference
● Bilateral talks occur per the wishes of the Israeli government with the goal of finding a political solution.
● Multilateral talks occur per the wishes of the Arab governments with the goal of discussing major issues including the refugee problem, water, etc. These issues concerned all parties.
● Israel, Likud government: "Facts on the ground"
● Shamir: I will negotiate toughly and pursue "facts on the ground"
● Unfortunately, Shamir was not ready for peace and was, at best, willing to give Palestinians limited autonmy which he and Rabin has offered Palestinians in 1989.
● The concept of "Gaza First" was first presented at the Madrid Conference. Gaza was a big problem for the Israelis due to its high population density, it was the place that the first intifada erupted, it had/ has high unemployment, and Israel was dependent upon day labor from its residents.
● Ultimately, the negotiated were stalled and no Israeli-Palestinian deal was reached.
The Early 1990s
- Shamir wanted to build settlements in the West Bank to accomodate immigrants from the former USSR.
- However, these immigrants were not willing to live in a conflict zone.
- The US repsonded critically to plans for further settlement.
- In 1992, the election went to Rabin.
- In 1992, Rabin had a direct confrontation with Hamas (a newly emerging political force)
● A young Israeli girl was killed.
● Rabin sent Hamas leaders to southern Lebanon.
● Sending leaders to southern Lebanon was a grave error because Hamas leaders were trained in suicide bombing techniques by Hezbollah.
- After his election, Rabin pursued peace with Syria.
● Rabin asked a US mediator to offer Syria the Golan Heights but it didn't work due to a miscommunication. As a result, Israel did not believe that the US was a serious broker.
- Rabin also pursued negotiations with Palestinians.
Oslo Negotiations
- These negotiations were conducted in secret on a small scale with Track II participants.
- One of the principle aims was the breakdown of enemy images.
- Gaza First was proposed at the beginning of negotiations.
- Rabin did not know about Oslo.
● He was initially furious when he learned about the secret negotiations but he soon realized that it was the only viable track left.
Oslo, Declaration of Principles
- Symbolic recognition
- Self-rule during the interim period
- Time schedule of five years with 1999 as the deadline for a final peace agreement
- Difficult issues (such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security, borders, etc.) should be solved later.
-Arafat made too many demands, stifling the process.
- However, both sides agreed to recognize each other as enemies which was significant.
Gaza/ Jeriko "First"
- Gaza/ Jeriko "first", May 1994
- Limited self rule of people not land
- Some sectors
- Palestinian Authority established
- Arafat and the PLO to Gaza, July 1994
- Palestinians allowed to establish a police force which was not a military but resembled one.
The Process
- There was strong grassroots support on both sides.
- But there was also strong and loud opposition/ religious inspired nationalists.
- Hebron Massacre, February 1994
- Hamas "Martyrs", April 1994
● Hamas attacks Israeli civilians for the first time.
- Continued opposition/ violent spoilers
- The mood among negotiators was collegial.
1995, Peace Agreement between Israel and Jordan
- Warm peace
- Still exists
Oslo II, 1995
- This agreement was drafted (signed?) on September 24, 1995.
- The agreement stipulated expanded self-rule for cities in the West Bank.
- As a result of the agreement, most Palestinians came under a different kind of rule.
● The West Bank was divided into Area A (Palestinian cities), Area B (Palestinian villages), and Aread C (Israeli settlement, military areas, and state lands).
- Rabin us assassinated by a right-wing religious extremist.
● He is killed after a peace rally in Tel Aviv.
● Israel is shocked because an Israeli should not kill another Israeli.
- The PLO holds elections in the West Bank in 1996
● International observers thought that the elections were relatively free and fair.
● Arafat won a landslide victory for President, receiving approximately 90% of the vote.
- This was a time period when there was support and euphoria about the peace process.
● Something like 70% of Israelis supported the peace process.
1996, Changing Winds
- Ayash killed by Israel followed by Hamas wave of "martyrs".
- Israeli elections
- Netanyahu elected Prime Minister, advocating peace and security
- Cold peace
- Increased violence
- In September 1996, relations deteriorate.
- Settlement activities
- Palestinian mobility decreases as Israel responds to terrorist attacks by closing points of entry.
- Netanyahu pressures Arafat to control Hamas
1997-2000
- 1997, Hebron
● Netanyahu wanted to renegotiate the Hebron Agreement.
- 1998, Wye River Agreement
● Minor changes to Oslo II
● Increased expansion of settlements
● Trust between parties deteriorates further
- 1997, first debate about corruption in the Palestinian government
- 1999, Labor returns to power in Israel
● Barak becomes Prime Minister
● Netanyahu admits to making mistakes which was a brilliant political move on his part and allowed him to return politics later.
● Barak promises peace within one year
● Barak intiates peace agreement with Syria but no agreement is reached.
- 2000, Camp David (II)
● Barak refuses to meet Arafat and Clinton accepts this.
● Clinton was ill-prepared and had to rely on his advisors.
● Parties spoke about key issues including Jerusalem and settlements.
● Barak offers approximately 94% of the West Bank to Palestinians including 90% of East Jerusalem. Unfortunately, this deal was only offered verbally and was later withdrawn.
● Negotiations broke down and Israelis and Palestinians were furious.
- The al-Aqsa intifada breaks out
● Confrontations occur all over the West Bank and Gaza.
● It is the most violent period to date.
Taba
- Egyptian and Jordanian leaders present.
- Lack of grassroots support on both sides
- A political solution was on the table but could not be signed.
- This was a very complicated period.
- There was increasingly a global consensus on a two state solution.
- George W. Bush accepts a two state solution which is significant because no other president and had done so.
2002, Roadmap to Peace
- Accepted by the UN Security Council
- Leaders from both sides (Palestine and Israel) were pressured to accept
- Track I approach (top-down)
● This is probably why it has not succeeded thus far.
Lingering Questions
- Are approximately 5,000 violent, radical Israeli settlers holding the peace process hostage?
- Can land swaps compensate for areas annexed by Israeli settlers?
- What will be the fate of holy sites?
- Is there a Palestinian right to return?
● Should Palestinians be allowed to return to Israel proper?
● Should those that do not or cannot return be compensated?
● Who is responsible for refugees?
- Can Track II negotiations work?
- Likewise, can secret meetings work?
- Will Israel accept a two state solution?
- How can Israel solve the paradox between the Jewish and democratic nature of the state of Israel while allowing for the return of Palestinian refugees?
- Is a two state solution a step toward a single state?
Lecture #11: Israeli Identity Politics
Michael Schulz
Please see powerpoint entitled, "Israeli ID politicsRS2235 vt10.ppt" at http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
Here are my notes:
Opening Note
- Isabell discussed Israeli identity politics during her previous lecture so we will approach the topic from a slightly different angle by discussing ethnic identity and Israeli national identity. In other words, today we will discuss Israeli society.
- In 1996, I (Schulz) wrote my dissertation on Israeli national identity and ethnic identity and the interlinkages between the two concepts.
What is ethnic identity?
- Ethnicity is a difficult concept to define.
¤ There are many schools of thought.
¤ Currently, the constructivist school of thought is dominant.
- What are the different schools of thought?
¤ Primordialist (Essentialist)- ethnic identity is given by biology or birth; this school of thought refers to an objective criteria; this school of thought is called into question by biological data that suggests we are all very similar biologically.
¤ Intrumentalist- ethnic identity is useful for political purposes, ie. the indigenous peoples' movement; unlike primordialists, instrumentalists refer to a subjective criteria.
¤ Constructivist- ethnic identity is perceived and dependent on relationships, situations, and contexts; identity is fluid and shifting because we are constantly learning from our experiences.
What is identity?
- Identity is also a hotly constested concept.
- There are two aspects of identity that are easy to accept:
¤ There are universal human attributes.
¤ But humans are also unique individuals.
- The idea that individuals share common attributes with members of a particular group, however, is contesteted.
How are ethnic identities formed?
- Ethnic identity is a social categorization.
- The social theory that you adapt has implications for social analysis because each theory has a direct link to perceptions of identity.
Class
- This theory originated with Karl Marx.
- According to this theory, there is an overlap between class and ethnic identity.
- Societies can be racist and/or oppresive.
- The dominant ethnic/ class group dominates society at the expense of other groups.
Pluralist
- This theory was developed as a criticism of the class and melting pot theories.
- Social groups create and maintain distinct systems but live together and interact with members of other groups.
- Both class differences and integration exist.
- Integration and separation are empirical questions and change over time.
Melting-Pot
- This theory was formulated in the 1950s.
- Ethnic identity is seen as backward/ tribal.
- National identity is modern and more desirable.
What is national identity?
- See Thomas Hylland Erikson
- Media creates a sense of national belonging even though members of a nation may never meet.
- Ethno-nationalists groups are in between ethnic groups and the nation-state.
¤ These groups possess a vision/ political ambition of a state.
¤ The state is viewed as a social project.
¤ Acceptance of a national identity implies the right to establish a state.
¤ Israelis did not accept the Palestinian national identity for decades because that acceptance would imply that Palestinians are entitled to create a state.
What is a nation-state?
- The nation-state is:
¤ territorially defined, and
¤ has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, and
¤ possesses authority over a specific population, and
¤ ideally develops into a homogenous identity/ common nationality, and
¤ the constitutent population possesses certain rights, duties (military service, taxes), and benefits (material welfare).
- All of the above must be fulfilled to create a successful nation-state.
How can ethnic identity be preserved over a period of time?
- Conversely, why do identities disappear?
- What institutions maintain ethnic identity?
- In the case of Judaism, Jewish ethnic identity was maintained by the synagogue.
- In the nation-state project, some succeed and some fail.
What are the four predominant positions in Israeli society?
1. Religious Zionists
- This group increasingly attained political power after 1967/1973.
2. Religious Non- Zionistists
- Israel is satanic.
- This group is losing power in Israel.
3. Non-religious Zionists
- Members of this group perceive Israel as a Jewish nation.
- Members of this group constitute the majority of Israeli society.
4. Non-Religious Non-Zionists
- This group conceives of Israel as a civic state.
- Israeli identity does not equal Jewish identity.
(- There are three categories listed in an Israeli passport: religious, civic, and national.)
Israeli Ethnicities and Social Stratifications
- See powerpoint
- Global links also greatly influence social identity.
¤ Russian immigrants from the former Soviet Union have pushed for improved relations between Israel and Europe.
- There are differences and divisions among members of each social group.
- Today, there is a different kind of Ashkenazi dominance.
-Schulz examined 4 dimensions in his disseration:
1. identification- Israeli, Arab, Jew, etc.
2. amalgamation- friendship and marriage patterns; social and biological intereactions
3. acculturation- feelings and sense of common identity and feelings and sense of belonging to s sib-identity; support for the political system and Israeli culture
4. socioeconomic and political issues- how are key political positions allocated among different groups; what are the perceived class/ethnic differences
- When asked about Israeli society, the most dominant answers were that it should be a mixed society or that the current social arrangement is the best arrangement.
¤ The first answer is evidence of some tolerance for difference in Israeli society.
- When Schulz conducted his research, he found that there were class differences along ethnic lines.
Jews (Israelization - Judaization)
- civic secularlists (approx. 12%)
- secularists (approx. 35%)
- civic nationalists (approx. 9%)
- nationalists (approx. 30%)
- confessionalists (approx. 14%)
¤ settlers / extremists
- Over time, those of the left move more towards the left and those on the right move more towards the right.
- In other words, Israeli society is polarized.
Arabs (Israelization - Polarization)
- civic secularists (approx. 13%)
- secularists (approx. 20%)
- civic confessionalists (approx. 15%)
- Islamists (approx. 17%)
- Arab/ Palestinian nationalists (approx. 35%)
- Opinions are more narrow/ clustered among Arabs.
- When Schulz conducted his research, Arabs primarily identified themselves as Israeli-Christians, Israeli-Druze, Israeli-Muslims, etc.
¤ However, this may not be the same today.
- Many Arabs say that they believe in the current political system. That is, they accept Jewish majority rule.
- Marriage between Arabs and Jews is almost non-existent.
- Arab integration into Israeli society has increased tensions between men and women and led to an increase in divorce rates. In other words, classic hierarchical structures have been challenged.
- The Druze are the most privileged among the Arab groups while the Muslims are the least priveleged.
Conclusion
- Integration does exist even among Israeli Arabs.
- Melting exists but is not, necessarily, conducted according to the melting pot theory.
- However, there are socioeconomic gaps along ethnic lines.
- Also, group identitifications shift all the time.
- Among Jews, in times of peace, Israelization prevails while in time of conflict, Jewishization prevails.
Please see powerpoint entitled, "Israeli ID politicsRS2235 vt10.ppt" at http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
Here are my notes:
Opening Note
- Isabell discussed Israeli identity politics during her previous lecture so we will approach the topic from a slightly different angle by discussing ethnic identity and Israeli national identity. In other words, today we will discuss Israeli society.
- In 1996, I (Schulz) wrote my dissertation on Israeli national identity and ethnic identity and the interlinkages between the two concepts.
What is ethnic identity?
- Ethnicity is a difficult concept to define.
¤ There are many schools of thought.
¤ Currently, the constructivist school of thought is dominant.
- What are the different schools of thought?
¤ Primordialist (Essentialist)- ethnic identity is given by biology or birth; this school of thought refers to an objective criteria; this school of thought is called into question by biological data that suggests we are all very similar biologically.
¤ Intrumentalist- ethnic identity is useful for political purposes, ie. the indigenous peoples' movement; unlike primordialists, instrumentalists refer to a subjective criteria.
¤ Constructivist- ethnic identity is perceived and dependent on relationships, situations, and contexts; identity is fluid and shifting because we are constantly learning from our experiences.
What is identity?
- Identity is also a hotly constested concept.
- There are two aspects of identity that are easy to accept:
¤ There are universal human attributes.
¤ But humans are also unique individuals.
- The idea that individuals share common attributes with members of a particular group, however, is contesteted.
How are ethnic identities formed?
- Ethnic identity is a social categorization.
- The social theory that you adapt has implications for social analysis because each theory has a direct link to perceptions of identity.
Class
- This theory originated with Karl Marx.
- According to this theory, there is an overlap between class and ethnic identity.
- Societies can be racist and/or oppresive.
- The dominant ethnic/ class group dominates society at the expense of other groups.
Pluralist
- This theory was developed as a criticism of the class and melting pot theories.
- Social groups create and maintain distinct systems but live together and interact with members of other groups.
- Both class differences and integration exist.
- Integration and separation are empirical questions and change over time.
Melting-Pot
- This theory was formulated in the 1950s.
- Ethnic identity is seen as backward/ tribal.
- National identity is modern and more desirable.
What is national identity?
- See Thomas Hylland Erikson
- Media creates a sense of national belonging even though members of a nation may never meet.
- Ethno-nationalists groups are in between ethnic groups and the nation-state.
¤ These groups possess a vision/ political ambition of a state.
¤ The state is viewed as a social project.
¤ Acceptance of a national identity implies the right to establish a state.
¤ Israelis did not accept the Palestinian national identity for decades because that acceptance would imply that Palestinians are entitled to create a state.
What is a nation-state?
- The nation-state is:
¤ territorially defined, and
¤ has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, and
¤ possesses authority over a specific population, and
¤ ideally develops into a homogenous identity/ common nationality, and
¤ the constitutent population possesses certain rights, duties (military service, taxes), and benefits (material welfare).
- All of the above must be fulfilled to create a successful nation-state.
How can ethnic identity be preserved over a period of time?
- Conversely, why do identities disappear?
- What institutions maintain ethnic identity?
- In the case of Judaism, Jewish ethnic identity was maintained by the synagogue.
- In the nation-state project, some succeed and some fail.
What are the four predominant positions in Israeli society?
1. Religious Zionists
- This group increasingly attained political power after 1967/1973.
2. Religious Non- Zionistists
- Israel is satanic.
- This group is losing power in Israel.
3. Non-religious Zionists
- Members of this group perceive Israel as a Jewish nation.
- Members of this group constitute the majority of Israeli society.
4. Non-Religious Non-Zionists
- This group conceives of Israel as a civic state.
- Israeli identity does not equal Jewish identity.
(- There are three categories listed in an Israeli passport: religious, civic, and national.)
Israeli Ethnicities and Social Stratifications
- See powerpoint
- Global links also greatly influence social identity.
¤ Russian immigrants from the former Soviet Union have pushed for improved relations between Israel and Europe.
- There are differences and divisions among members of each social group.
- Today, there is a different kind of Ashkenazi dominance.
-Schulz examined 4 dimensions in his disseration:
1. identification- Israeli, Arab, Jew, etc.
2. amalgamation- friendship and marriage patterns; social and biological intereactions
3. acculturation- feelings and sense of common identity and feelings and sense of belonging to s sib-identity; support for the political system and Israeli culture
4. socioeconomic and political issues- how are key political positions allocated among different groups; what are the perceived class/ethnic differences
- When asked about Israeli society, the most dominant answers were that it should be a mixed society or that the current social arrangement is the best arrangement.
¤ The first answer is evidence of some tolerance for difference in Israeli society.
- When Schulz conducted his research, he found that there were class differences along ethnic lines.
Jews (Israelization - Judaization)
- civic secularlists (approx. 12%)
- secularists (approx. 35%)
- civic nationalists (approx. 9%)
- nationalists (approx. 30%)
- confessionalists (approx. 14%)
¤ settlers / extremists
- Over time, those of the left move more towards the left and those on the right move more towards the right.
- In other words, Israeli society is polarized.
Arabs (Israelization - Polarization)
- civic secularists (approx. 13%)
- secularists (approx. 20%)
- civic confessionalists (approx. 15%)
- Islamists (approx. 17%)
- Arab/ Palestinian nationalists (approx. 35%)
- Opinions are more narrow/ clustered among Arabs.
- When Schulz conducted his research, Arabs primarily identified themselves as Israeli-Christians, Israeli-Druze, Israeli-Muslims, etc.
¤ However, this may not be the same today.
- Many Arabs say that they believe in the current political system. That is, they accept Jewish majority rule.
- Marriage between Arabs and Jews is almost non-existent.
- Arab integration into Israeli society has increased tensions between men and women and led to an increase in divorce rates. In other words, classic hierarchical structures have been challenged.
- The Druze are the most privileged among the Arab groups while the Muslims are the least priveleged.
Conclusion
- Integration does exist even among Israeli Arabs.
- Melting exists but is not, necessarily, conducted according to the melting pot theory.
- However, there are socioeconomic gaps along ethnic lines.
- Also, group identitifications shift all the time.
- Among Jews, in times of peace, Israelization prevails while in time of conflict, Jewishization prevails.
Lecture #10: Palestinian Identity and Diaspora
Helena Lindholm Schulz
Please see powerpoint (soon to be) posted at: http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
Here are my---not very complete--- notes:
Background
- The Palestinian population is disbursed throughout the world due to "normal" migration and al Nakba or the catastrophe in which Palestinians left historical Palestine in 1947/1948.
-The focus of today's lecture is how Palestinian identity is and has been shaped.
- Palestinian identity has primarily been shaped by displacement, exile, and fragmentation.
- "The Land" is incredibly important due to the forced absence of Palestinians from the land of Palestine.
Diaspora Concept
- A diaspora is a population which departed from the "home" country by force or other means and now resides in two or more countries.
Patterns of Migration
- The ultimate focal point of Palestinian identity is Al-Nakba, 1947/1948.
¤ This serves as the begining of many individual's stories of expulsion.
¤ Approximately 700,000 Palestinians fled at this time.
- 1967, Six-Day War
¤ Approximately 300,000 Palestinians fled and/or were prohibited from returning to Palestine.
- Migration did occur prior to and after 1947 and 1967.
¤ Christian Palestinians migrated to the Americas.
- The Palestinian condition is very much shaped by migration.
- It is difficult to count the numebr of Palestinians in a given country because they are often considered stateless or citizens of other Middle Eastern countries.
¤ Many Palestinian refugees living in Sweden come from Lebanon.
¤ Migration to Sweden occured after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
Al-Nakba
- This is a formative event for Palestinian identity.
- As a result of Al-Nakba, Palestinians became the "wanderers of the earth" and participants in an "endless journey".
Refugees
- The Palestinian refugee question is one of the oldest refugee questions of modern times.
- The United Nations (UN) established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in 1950 to help Palestinian refugees.
¤ Palestinians are the only refugee group handled by an exclusive UN agency.
- In order to be counted as a refugee after 1948, Palestinians had to have lost both their homes and their means of livelihood.
¤ This is an inherited status.
- There are approximately 4.767 million registered Palestinian refugees throughout the world including those living in the West Bank and Gaza.
- Palestinian refugees are accorded different rights and status depending on their country of residence.
¤ In Lebanon, Palestinians are "foreigners" whereas, in Jordan, many Palestinians are citizens.
Rootlessness/ Homelessness
- Displacement causes an intense search for a lost place.
- Identity is formed out of place/ homelessness/ constant journey.
- Fragmentation/ rootlessness is constitutive of Palestinian identity.
¤ This is a paradox in comparison to other national(ist) narratives.)
Immobility/ Denial/ Confinement
- Palestinians are restricted from moving freely.
¤ There are checkpoints, fences, road blocks, etc.
¤ Many Palestinians are confined due to a lack of valid travel documents.
- Many Palestinians speak of life as a prison.
¤ Gaza: world's largest civilian prison
¤ The "barrier" wall resembles a prison wall.
Return
- Return is an important focal point in Palestinian politics.
- Land is romanticized and idealized.
- There is a strong need to reclaim history and/or claim the right to history.
- PLO: did/do not want Palestinians to integrate into Arab countries of residence.
Home
- Home has a special meaning which has been lost and is difficult to recreate in exile.
- Stories about "home" are fictious and nostalgic but also very important.
Time
- Many await a time in the near future when they may return.
- Refugees born in exile do not have memories of their own.
¤ They have/ had to rely on the stories of their family members.
¤ They do not experience a loss but a lack.
Struggle
- In the decades after al-Nakba, it was difficult for Palestinians to organize.
- The PLO was formed under an Egyptian initiative.
- The ultimate aim of Palestinian struggle: to return, to change from refugees to returnees.
- PLO: Palestinians should be active in shaping their own destinies. In other words, they should turn passive suffering into active struggling.
- There are two poles of Palestinian identity:
¤ Suffering
¤ Struggling, including armed struggle
- Romanticized notions of return have helped fuel struggle.
- PLO: feared integration would erode the Palestinian right to return to historic Palestine.
Transnationalism
- Generations of Palestinians have been born and have grown up in exile. These generations have no memories or personal images of Palestine.
- Five decades of exile have had an impact on Palestinian identity.
- Are Palestinians slowing forgetting or adding and adjusting?
- Transnationalism is something overlooked (until recently) by integration scholars in Western societies.
Palestinian Nationalism
- Palestinian nationalism was created out of exile and expulsion.
- Territory and land are important focal points.
- Palestinian nationalism is defined both by hyper-mobility and absolute confinement.
Maintaining Contact
- Many Palestinians who have the means and the documents, vacation in the West Bank.
¤ These Palestinians may send their children to Palestine to learn Arabic and to receive a cultural education.
- Of course, contact with family abroad has many costs including time, money, and effort.
- Today, complementary identities may be a better description of Palestinian identities--- rather than hybrid identities.
J. Clifford
- "This consitutive suffering coexists with the skills of survival...Diaspora consciousness lives loss and hope as a defining tension."
Please see powerpoint (soon to be) posted at: http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
Here are my---not very complete--- notes:
Background
- The Palestinian population is disbursed throughout the world due to "normal" migration and al Nakba or the catastrophe in which Palestinians left historical Palestine in 1947/1948.
-The focus of today's lecture is how Palestinian identity is and has been shaped.
- Palestinian identity has primarily been shaped by displacement, exile, and fragmentation.
- "The Land" is incredibly important due to the forced absence of Palestinians from the land of Palestine.
Diaspora Concept
- A diaspora is a population which departed from the "home" country by force or other means and now resides in two or more countries.
Patterns of Migration
- The ultimate focal point of Palestinian identity is Al-Nakba, 1947/1948.
¤ This serves as the begining of many individual's stories of expulsion.
¤ Approximately 700,000 Palestinians fled at this time.
- 1967, Six-Day War
¤ Approximately 300,000 Palestinians fled and/or were prohibited from returning to Palestine.
- Migration did occur prior to and after 1947 and 1967.
¤ Christian Palestinians migrated to the Americas.
- The Palestinian condition is very much shaped by migration.
- It is difficult to count the numebr of Palestinians in a given country because they are often considered stateless or citizens of other Middle Eastern countries.
¤ Many Palestinian refugees living in Sweden come from Lebanon.
¤ Migration to Sweden occured after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
Al-Nakba
- This is a formative event for Palestinian identity.
- As a result of Al-Nakba, Palestinians became the "wanderers of the earth" and participants in an "endless journey".
Refugees
- The Palestinian refugee question is one of the oldest refugee questions of modern times.
- The United Nations (UN) established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in 1950 to help Palestinian refugees.
¤ Palestinians are the only refugee group handled by an exclusive UN agency.
- In order to be counted as a refugee after 1948, Palestinians had to have lost both their homes and their means of livelihood.
¤ This is an inherited status.
- There are approximately 4.767 million registered Palestinian refugees throughout the world including those living in the West Bank and Gaza.
- Palestinian refugees are accorded different rights and status depending on their country of residence.
¤ In Lebanon, Palestinians are "foreigners" whereas, in Jordan, many Palestinians are citizens.
Rootlessness/ Homelessness
- Displacement causes an intense search for a lost place.
- Identity is formed out of place/ homelessness/ constant journey.
- Fragmentation/ rootlessness is constitutive of Palestinian identity.
¤ This is a paradox in comparison to other national(ist) narratives.)
Immobility/ Denial/ Confinement
- Palestinians are restricted from moving freely.
¤ There are checkpoints, fences, road blocks, etc.
¤ Many Palestinians are confined due to a lack of valid travel documents.
- Many Palestinians speak of life as a prison.
¤ Gaza: world's largest civilian prison
¤ The "barrier" wall resembles a prison wall.
Return
- Return is an important focal point in Palestinian politics.
- Land is romanticized and idealized.
- There is a strong need to reclaim history and/or claim the right to history.
- PLO: did/do not want Palestinians to integrate into Arab countries of residence.
Home
- Home has a special meaning which has been lost and is difficult to recreate in exile.
- Stories about "home" are fictious and nostalgic but also very important.
Time
- Many await a time in the near future when they may return.
- Refugees born in exile do not have memories of their own.
¤ They have/ had to rely on the stories of their family members.
¤ They do not experience a loss but a lack.
Struggle
- In the decades after al-Nakba, it was difficult for Palestinians to organize.
- The PLO was formed under an Egyptian initiative.
- The ultimate aim of Palestinian struggle: to return, to change from refugees to returnees.
- PLO: Palestinians should be active in shaping their own destinies. In other words, they should turn passive suffering into active struggling.
- There are two poles of Palestinian identity:
¤ Suffering
¤ Struggling, including armed struggle
- Romanticized notions of return have helped fuel struggle.
- PLO: feared integration would erode the Palestinian right to return to historic Palestine.
Transnationalism
- Generations of Palestinians have been born and have grown up in exile. These generations have no memories or personal images of Palestine.
- Five decades of exile have had an impact on Palestinian identity.
- Are Palestinians slowing forgetting or adding and adjusting?
- Transnationalism is something overlooked (until recently) by integration scholars in Western societies.
Palestinian Nationalism
- Palestinian nationalism was created out of exile and expulsion.
- Territory and land are important focal points.
- Palestinian nationalism is defined both by hyper-mobility and absolute confinement.
Maintaining Contact
- Many Palestinians who have the means and the documents, vacation in the West Bank.
¤ These Palestinians may send their children to Palestine to learn Arabic and to receive a cultural education.
- Of course, contact with family abroad has many costs including time, money, and effort.
- Today, complementary identities may be a better description of Palestinian identities--- rather than hybrid identities.
J. Clifford
- "This consitutive suffering coexists with the skills of survival...Diaspora consciousness lives loss and hope as a defining tension."
Lecture #9: Family and Gender
Maria Malmstrom
Please see powerpoint posted at: http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
(Unfortunately, this powerpoint was not posted as of Thursday, 6 May but it should be posted soon.)
Please see powerpoint posted at: http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
(Unfortunately, this powerpoint was not posted as of Thursday, 6 May but it should be posted soon.)
Lecture #8: Israeli Society
Isabell Schierenbeck, Department of Political Science
The powerpoint file will be posted shortly at http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
Opening Note: Isabell began this lecture in March. As a result, she briefly reviewed what she had already covered before moving on to the cleavage between Jews and Palestinians in Israeli society.
Cleavages in Israeli Politics
- Jews-Palestinians (approximately 20% of the Israeli population consists of Arab Israelis.)
- Ashkenazim (European/ American/ Russian Jews)- Mizrachim (Middle Eastern and North African Jews)
- Religious (Ultra-orthodox and orthdox Jews and Muslim Arabs)- Secular
- Sabra (Native-born Israelis)- Immigrants
- Left- Right
- In exploring each of the above cleavages, we will discuss what the conflict of interest is about, who is represented in each group and where they live, as well as forms of mobilization and political behavior.
Is the Israeli case exceptional?
- No.
- Although many see the Israeli case as exceptional it is not.
- Israeli is no more special than other countries and should not be treated as unique.
- If Israel were exceptional, it would be much more difficult to resolve the conflict.
Jews-Palestinians
Conflict of Interests
- land
¤ internal refugees
¤ 70% of Palestinian land has been confiscated and continues to be confiscated. This is due, in part, to the traditional practice of not using written land contracts. the Israeli government also confiscated land for "security reasons" and because it is considered "abandoned."
¤ In addition, Palestians cannot live and build where ever they want.
- work
¤ Many Palestinian farmers had land confiscated and had to find other work in low skill professions and jobs.
¤ However, Palestinians are doing better and better economically.
¤ Nevertheless, discrimination still exists.
- immigration
¤ Jews have "the right of return".
¤Palestinian citizenship is strictly limited and regulated.
¤ Palestinian citizenship is limited in order to maintain a Jewish majority.
- discrimination in general (cp military service)
¤ Palestinians do not have the right to participate in military service for "security reasons".
¤ Unfortunately for Palestinians, many social benefits are tied to military service and military service is incredibly important in Israeli-society and politics.
¤ Although Palestinians are taxed at the same level as non-Palestinians, they receive vastly unequal access to and funding for social services such as education, infrastructue, etc.
Mobilization and Political Parties/ Organizations
- 1948-1966: military control over the Israeli-Palestinian population.
- 1967, Six-Day War: greater awareness about the "Palestinian Question", different Arab parties emerge.
- Land Day, 30 March 1976: protest over land confiscation in the Galilee.
- Human rights groups emerge, mainly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982
- 1990s: Katzir case; Beduin campaigns
- Palestinians experienced limited political mobilization prior to 1966.
From Zionist Parties to Arab Parties
- In the 2006 election, 70% of Israeli-Arabs vote for Arab parties.
- Democratic Arab Party (DAP), moderate
- Hadash (former communist party, oldest "Arab" party), Jewish-Arab, moderate, secular
- Balad (Azmi Bishara), nationalist, "radical"
- Islamic movement, division between the north and south, the south with DAP
- The number of Arab parties and fragmentation of these parties is problematic and stiffles unity but it could also be thought of as a sign of a healthy difference of opinion among Arab voters.
- In Israel, a party only needs 2% of the vote to get into the Knesset. (In comparison, a party needs 4% of the vote in Sweden.)
- However, no party can be anti-Zionist.
Ashkenazim-Mizrachim
- All Israelis know which of the above groups they belong to.
- 50% of Israelis born in Israel today are Ashkenazim and 50% are Mizrachim.
- Mizrachim predominantly live in the south.
- In general, Ashkenazim are better educated and more priveleged.
Conflict of Interests
- Ashkenazim hegemony; Mizrachim marginalization
- assimilation politics (maabarot), cultural marginalization
- development towns, socioeconomic marginalization
- educational system (50s reform, no place for traditional Mizrachim)
- renewed conflict due to post-Cold War immigration
Mobilization and Political Parties/ Organizations
- Black Panthers, 1970s
¤ Mizrachim youth movement to raise awareness about inequality.
¤ Many arguments leveled against Golda Meir.
- Likud (Menachem Begin, 1977)
¤ Begin realized this was a social issue and sought to politicize it.
¤ Begin focused on unemployment.
- Shas (1984, ultra-orthodox split)
¤ ethnic origin before religious identification
¤ Shas is a political success story.
¤ Even non-orthodox Mizrachim will vote for Shas.
Religious-Secular
- Ultra-orthodox (Haredim): 10% of the Israeli population
- Orthodox: 10%
- Traditional: 30%
- Secular: 50%
- The above groups intermix regularly with the notable exception of the ultra-orthodox.
- There are two large ultra-orthodox communities in Israel, one is Jerusalem and one in Tel Aviv.
- Ultra-orthodox Jews constitute and very poor segment of society.
- Ultra-orthodox Jews typically have very large families with approximately 10 children per family.
- The image of the ultra-orthodox Jew seems very different from the image of the "New Israeli".
- Ultra-orthodox Jews have their own educational systems where they primarily study the Torrah.
- In ultra-orthodox communities, the position of women is relatively low.
Conflict of Interests
- Zionism
¤ Ultra-orthodox Jews are not Zionist; they do not accept the state of Israel because it was not created by the messiah.
- Military service
¤ Ultra-orthodox Jews do not complete military service.
¤ Leftist Israelis who advocate peace must serve in the military but ultra-orthodox settlers are exempt.
- Family law
- Conversions and immigration
Mobilization and Political Parties/ Organizations
- Shift from strictly ultra-orthodox to religious Zionist
¤ This occured after the Six-Day War.
- Agudat parties: religious Zionist parties
- Anti-religious parties: Ratz, Meretz, Shinui
¤ The Shinui party refuses to sit in government with Shas.
(-There are 120 seats in the Knesset, thus a majority consists of 61 seats.
- The inclusion of a religious party is essential to building a coalition government.)
Sabra-Immigrants
(We did not have enough time to discuss this cleavage. Please see powerpoint for more information.)
Left-Right
- Israeli politicians are not particularly concerned about the environment or the economy, they are primarily concerned with the fate of the Occupied Territories which become a central issue after the Six-Day War.
- The right contend that Israel must keep the territories for security and religious reasons.
- The left (Labor) was held responsible for failures during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
- After 1973, Israeli politics shifted to the right.
The Left (Doves)
- Hadash
- Meretz (Ashkenazi)
- Labor
- Arab parties
The Rights (Hawks)
- Right-wing extremists
- Religious nationalists (Mafdal, Gush Emunim)
- Likud
- Russian parties, Shinui
The powerpoint file will be posted shortly at http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
Opening Note: Isabell began this lecture in March. As a result, she briefly reviewed what she had already covered before moving on to the cleavage between Jews and Palestinians in Israeli society.
Cleavages in Israeli Politics
- Jews-Palestinians (approximately 20% of the Israeli population consists of Arab Israelis.)
- Ashkenazim (European/ American/ Russian Jews)- Mizrachim (Middle Eastern and North African Jews)
- Religious (Ultra-orthodox and orthdox Jews and Muslim Arabs)- Secular
- Sabra (Native-born Israelis)- Immigrants
- Left- Right
- In exploring each of the above cleavages, we will discuss what the conflict of interest is about, who is represented in each group and where they live, as well as forms of mobilization and political behavior.
Is the Israeli case exceptional?
- No.
- Although many see the Israeli case as exceptional it is not.
- Israeli is no more special than other countries and should not be treated as unique.
- If Israel were exceptional, it would be much more difficult to resolve the conflict.
Jews-Palestinians
Conflict of Interests
- land
¤ internal refugees
¤ 70% of Palestinian land has been confiscated and continues to be confiscated. This is due, in part, to the traditional practice of not using written land contracts. the Israeli government also confiscated land for "security reasons" and because it is considered "abandoned."
¤ In addition, Palestians cannot live and build where ever they want.
- work
¤ Many Palestinian farmers had land confiscated and had to find other work in low skill professions and jobs.
¤ However, Palestinians are doing better and better economically.
¤ Nevertheless, discrimination still exists.
- immigration
¤ Jews have "the right of return".
¤Palestinian citizenship is strictly limited and regulated.
¤ Palestinian citizenship is limited in order to maintain a Jewish majority.
- discrimination in general (cp military service)
¤ Palestinians do not have the right to participate in military service for "security reasons".
¤ Unfortunately for Palestinians, many social benefits are tied to military service and military service is incredibly important in Israeli-society and politics.
¤ Although Palestinians are taxed at the same level as non-Palestinians, they receive vastly unequal access to and funding for social services such as education, infrastructue, etc.
Mobilization and Political Parties/ Organizations
- 1948-1966: military control over the Israeli-Palestinian population.
- 1967, Six-Day War: greater awareness about the "Palestinian Question", different Arab parties emerge.
- Land Day, 30 March 1976: protest over land confiscation in the Galilee.
- Human rights groups emerge, mainly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982
- 1990s: Katzir case; Beduin campaigns
- Palestinians experienced limited political mobilization prior to 1966.
From Zionist Parties to Arab Parties
- In the 2006 election, 70% of Israeli-Arabs vote for Arab parties.
- Democratic Arab Party (DAP), moderate
- Hadash (former communist party, oldest "Arab" party), Jewish-Arab, moderate, secular
- Balad (Azmi Bishara), nationalist, "radical"
- Islamic movement, division between the north and south, the south with DAP
- The number of Arab parties and fragmentation of these parties is problematic and stiffles unity but it could also be thought of as a sign of a healthy difference of opinion among Arab voters.
- In Israel, a party only needs 2% of the vote to get into the Knesset. (In comparison, a party needs 4% of the vote in Sweden.)
- However, no party can be anti-Zionist.
Ashkenazim-Mizrachim
- All Israelis know which of the above groups they belong to.
- 50% of Israelis born in Israel today are Ashkenazim and 50% are Mizrachim.
- Mizrachim predominantly live in the south.
- In general, Ashkenazim are better educated and more priveleged.
Conflict of Interests
- Ashkenazim hegemony; Mizrachim marginalization
- assimilation politics (maabarot), cultural marginalization
- development towns, socioeconomic marginalization
- educational system (50s reform, no place for traditional Mizrachim)
- renewed conflict due to post-Cold War immigration
Mobilization and Political Parties/ Organizations
- Black Panthers, 1970s
¤ Mizrachim youth movement to raise awareness about inequality.
¤ Many arguments leveled against Golda Meir.
- Likud (Menachem Begin, 1977)
¤ Begin realized this was a social issue and sought to politicize it.
¤ Begin focused on unemployment.
- Shas (1984, ultra-orthodox split)
¤ ethnic origin before religious identification
¤ Shas is a political success story.
¤ Even non-orthodox Mizrachim will vote for Shas.
Religious-Secular
- Ultra-orthodox (Haredim): 10% of the Israeli population
- Orthodox: 10%
- Traditional: 30%
- Secular: 50%
- The above groups intermix regularly with the notable exception of the ultra-orthodox.
- There are two large ultra-orthodox communities in Israel, one is Jerusalem and one in Tel Aviv.
- Ultra-orthodox Jews constitute and very poor segment of society.
- Ultra-orthodox Jews typically have very large families with approximately 10 children per family.
- The image of the ultra-orthodox Jew seems very different from the image of the "New Israeli".
- Ultra-orthodox Jews have their own educational systems where they primarily study the Torrah.
- In ultra-orthodox communities, the position of women is relatively low.
Conflict of Interests
- Zionism
¤ Ultra-orthodox Jews are not Zionist; they do not accept the state of Israel because it was not created by the messiah.
- Military service
¤ Ultra-orthodox Jews do not complete military service.
¤ Leftist Israelis who advocate peace must serve in the military but ultra-orthodox settlers are exempt.
- Family law
- Conversions and immigration
Mobilization and Political Parties/ Organizations
- Shift from strictly ultra-orthodox to religious Zionist
¤ This occured after the Six-Day War.
- Agudat parties: religious Zionist parties
- Anti-religious parties: Ratz, Meretz, Shinui
¤ The Shinui party refuses to sit in government with Shas.
(-There are 120 seats in the Knesset, thus a majority consists of 61 seats.
- The inclusion of a religious party is essential to building a coalition government.)
Sabra-Immigrants
(We did not have enough time to discuss this cleavage. Please see powerpoint for more information.)
Left-Right
- Israeli politicians are not particularly concerned about the environment or the economy, they are primarily concerned with the fate of the Occupied Territories which become a central issue after the Six-Day War.
- The right contend that Israel must keep the territories for security and religious reasons.
- The left (Labor) was held responsible for failures during the Yom Kippur War in 1973.
- After 1973, Israeli politics shifted to the right.
The Left (Doves)
- Hadash
- Meretz (Ashkenazi)
- Labor
- Arab parties
The Rights (Hawks)
- Right-wing extremists
- Religious nationalists (Mafdal, Gush Emunim)
- Likud
- Russian parties, Shinui
Lecture #7: Palestinian Society
Michael Schulz
Please see powerpoint entitled, "Palestinian SocietyRS2235 vt10.ppt" at http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
Here are some of the highlights:
- Throughout today's lecture we will discuss the major cleavages in Palestinian society. Unfortunately, we will not have time to discuss gender and family but that will be covered in assigned readings and subsequent lectures.
- We will also focus on society within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, it is important to keep in mind that Palestinians live in other states in the Middle East including Israel and that millions of Palestinians live in the diaspora in Europe and the U.S.
What is society and what relationship does does have to the state?
- There are many theories about the nature and role of society as well as links between the state and society, the state and government, and the state and nation.
- For the sake of our discussion, it is important to understand prevalent social arrangements in Middle Eastern states.
¤ Families often control important state positions.
¤ Certain ethnicities are priveleged above others.
¤ The closer an ethnicity is to the state apparatus, the more powerful the ethnicity is within society.
Social Images
- Israeli military incursions, closers, and threats of violence
- Separation wall and loss of income
- Lack of mobility
How has the conflicted affected Palestinians?
- Many Palestinians suffer from depression, insomnia, bedwetting, nightmares, phobias, separation anxiety, inability to concentrate, etc.
- Overall, Palestinians have poor general health.
-The occupation has had a profound impact on Palestinians both physically and psychologically.
- Domestic violence and child abuse are endemic.
- Palestinians have a general feeling of insecurity as a result of the ever present prospect of home demolitions and land confiscation.
- The Palestinian population has dramatically increased in the last 20-30 years.
- Today, approximately 75% of the population is below the age of 20. (Demography is similar in other Arab states.)
- There is also an extremely high population density.
Who is Who in Palestine?
- Top level: political and miliary leaders
- Middle level: bureaucrats, academics, religious leaders, national NGO leaders
- Lower level: local activists, local NGO leaders, community leaders
- Palestinian society is extremely hierarchical.
- Few are at the top but those at the top are extremely wealthy.
- Socio-economic stratification leads to great frustrations within society.
Civil Society
- Palestine does contain a well functioning civil society but only about 11% of the population participates.
- Lack of participation may be explained by control exerted by top leaders.
- Palestinian civil society is highly politicized which makes things complicated especially if you believe that political parties are not a part of civil society.
- After Oslo, civil society was restructured and new categories emerged including the peace industry, Islamic organizations, and organizations linked to the PLO.
- While Islamic organizations are grass roots oriented, the peace industry and PLO affliated organizations are not.
Religiousity, September 2009
- Palestinian society is very religious and the vast majority are Muslim.
- Most Christians have emigrated because they possess greater opportunities to do so.
Work, September 2009
- Approximately 67% of Palestinians are unemployed. (But this percentage is heavily dependent on how one defines employment.
- Unemployment is higher in the Gaza Strip than the West Bank.
- Approximately 6% of Palestinans work as farmers.
- The clan system/ family structure helps to ensure that family members' needs are met.
- Huge socio-economic disparities exist within society.
Material Standard, September 2009
- Approximately 90% of Palestine families have satelite dishes and mobile phone but almost no one has a dishwasher. (This is explained, in part, by priorities and gender roles.)
Newspapers, September 2009
- Approximately 30% of the population read newspapers.
- The majority of those who read newspapers read al-Quds.
Radio/ TV, September 2009
- Most people get their information from radio or television.
- al Jazeera is the most watched television network.
- Most Palestinians do not follow Israeli news, the BBC, or CNN.
- Editorial note: It is sad that Palestinians do not follow Israeli news because it is often balanced and each group could learn a lot from each other.
Israeli Occupation, September 2009
- 9.4% of Palesitnians have been wounded by Israeli forces.
- 10.2% have been imprisoned in Israel.
- 14.7% have had land confiscated from their family since 1967.
- Editorial note: Statistics about violence are difficult to interpret given the prevalence of violence in Palestinian society in general.
Democracy, September 2009
- 32% believe that a Palestinian state should not be modeled according to any existing state system.
- 16% believe that Jordan's "democratic" system is worth emulating.
- More than 70% of Palesitnians view themselves as democraitc, at least ideologically.
- WHo are the anti-democrats?
¤ The answer to this quesiton is unclear.
¤ Religious people who are not a part of Hamas or the Muslim brotherhood do not consider themselves as political.
- Most Palestinians do not believe that democracy and Islam are mutually exclusive. This was evidenced by the election of Hamas in 2006.
Trust levels, September 2009
- Palestinians tend to trust organizations of civil society more than state organizations.
- 61.4% trust universities but this percentage represents a decrease since the previous survey.
- 45.6% in the West Bank and 28.1% in Gaza trust the courts.
- 50.9% trust the Palestinian press.
- Security reforms have increased trust in certain state organizations such as the courts, police, and security forces from 2006-2009.
- Trust in state leaders and organizations is generally decreasing in the Gaza Strip.
Cleavages
- Insiders - outsiders
- West Bank - Gaza Strip
- Israelis - Palestinians (This is the biggest and most consequential cleavage.)
- Fatah - Hamas
- Cleavages within the PLO (This is linked to the diaspora, particularly in Syria and Lebanon.)
- Cleavages within and between clan and family system
- Class differences
- Muslims - Christians
- Generations
- Resources (This is linked to the occupation.)
Final Note
- The majority of the people are waiting for the next new movement to emerge and serve their interests.
- Unfortunately, this new movement does not currently exist.
Please see powerpoint entitled, "Palestinian SocietyRS2235 vt10.ppt" at http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
Here are some of the highlights:
- Throughout today's lecture we will discuss the major cleavages in Palestinian society. Unfortunately, we will not have time to discuss gender and family but that will be covered in assigned readings and subsequent lectures.
- We will also focus on society within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, it is important to keep in mind that Palestinians live in other states in the Middle East including Israel and that millions of Palestinians live in the diaspora in Europe and the U.S.
What is society and what relationship does does have to the state?
- There are many theories about the nature and role of society as well as links between the state and society, the state and government, and the state and nation.
- For the sake of our discussion, it is important to understand prevalent social arrangements in Middle Eastern states.
¤ Families often control important state positions.
¤ Certain ethnicities are priveleged above others.
¤ The closer an ethnicity is to the state apparatus, the more powerful the ethnicity is within society.
Social Images
- Israeli military incursions, closers, and threats of violence
- Separation wall and loss of income
- Lack of mobility
How has the conflicted affected Palestinians?
- Many Palestinians suffer from depression, insomnia, bedwetting, nightmares, phobias, separation anxiety, inability to concentrate, etc.
- Overall, Palestinians have poor general health.
-The occupation has had a profound impact on Palestinians both physically and psychologically.
- Domestic violence and child abuse are endemic.
- Palestinians have a general feeling of insecurity as a result of the ever present prospect of home demolitions and land confiscation.
- The Palestinian population has dramatically increased in the last 20-30 years.
- Today, approximately 75% of the population is below the age of 20. (Demography is similar in other Arab states.)
- There is also an extremely high population density.
Who is Who in Palestine?
- Top level: political and miliary leaders
- Middle level: bureaucrats, academics, religious leaders, national NGO leaders
- Lower level: local activists, local NGO leaders, community leaders
- Palestinian society is extremely hierarchical.
- Few are at the top but those at the top are extremely wealthy.
- Socio-economic stratification leads to great frustrations within society.
Civil Society
- Palestine does contain a well functioning civil society but only about 11% of the population participates.
- Lack of participation may be explained by control exerted by top leaders.
- Palestinian civil society is highly politicized which makes things complicated especially if you believe that political parties are not a part of civil society.
- After Oslo, civil society was restructured and new categories emerged including the peace industry, Islamic organizations, and organizations linked to the PLO.
- While Islamic organizations are grass roots oriented, the peace industry and PLO affliated organizations are not.
Religiousity, September 2009
- Palestinian society is very religious and the vast majority are Muslim.
- Most Christians have emigrated because they possess greater opportunities to do so.
Work, September 2009
- Approximately 67% of Palestinians are unemployed. (But this percentage is heavily dependent on how one defines employment.
- Unemployment is higher in the Gaza Strip than the West Bank.
- Approximately 6% of Palestinans work as farmers.
- The clan system/ family structure helps to ensure that family members' needs are met.
- Huge socio-economic disparities exist within society.
Material Standard, September 2009
- Approximately 90% of Palestine families have satelite dishes and mobile phone but almost no one has a dishwasher. (This is explained, in part, by priorities and gender roles.)
Newspapers, September 2009
- Approximately 30% of the population read newspapers.
- The majority of those who read newspapers read al-Quds.
Radio/ TV, September 2009
- Most people get their information from radio or television.
- al Jazeera is the most watched television network.
- Most Palestinians do not follow Israeli news, the BBC, or CNN.
- Editorial note: It is sad that Palestinians do not follow Israeli news because it is often balanced and each group could learn a lot from each other.
Israeli Occupation, September 2009
- 9.4% of Palesitnians have been wounded by Israeli forces.
- 10.2% have been imprisoned in Israel.
- 14.7% have had land confiscated from their family since 1967.
- Editorial note: Statistics about violence are difficult to interpret given the prevalence of violence in Palestinian society in general.
Democracy, September 2009
- 32% believe that a Palestinian state should not be modeled according to any existing state system.
- 16% believe that Jordan's "democratic" system is worth emulating.
- More than 70% of Palesitnians view themselves as democraitc, at least ideologically.
- WHo are the anti-democrats?
¤ The answer to this quesiton is unclear.
¤ Religious people who are not a part of Hamas or the Muslim brotherhood do not consider themselves as political.
- Most Palestinians do not believe that democracy and Islam are mutually exclusive. This was evidenced by the election of Hamas in 2006.
Trust levels, September 2009
- Palestinians tend to trust organizations of civil society more than state organizations.
- 61.4% trust universities but this percentage represents a decrease since the previous survey.
- 45.6% in the West Bank and 28.1% in Gaza trust the courts.
- 50.9% trust the Palestinian press.
- Security reforms have increased trust in certain state organizations such as the courts, police, and security forces from 2006-2009.
- Trust in state leaders and organizations is generally decreasing in the Gaza Strip.
Cleavages
- Insiders - outsiders
- West Bank - Gaza Strip
- Israelis - Palestinians (This is the biggest and most consequential cleavage.)
- Fatah - Hamas
- Cleavages within the PLO (This is linked to the diaspora, particularly in Syria and Lebanon.)
- Cleavages within and between clan and family system
- Class differences
- Muslims - Christians
- Generations
- Resources (This is linked to the occupation.)
Final Note
- The majority of the people are waiting for the next new movement to emerge and serve their interests.
- Unfortunately, this new movement does not currently exist.
Lecture #6: From Camp David to the First Intifada
Michael Schulz
Background: The Arab League and a Changing Middle East
- The Arab League was formed for two reasons:
o It was a response to Zionism.
o It was a response to the creation of independent Arab states in the 1920s.
- Dramatic changes occurred in the Middle East in the 1950s.
o There were many coups and regime changes.
o Ethnic divisions became increasingly important.
o There was a build-up of military capacity (The military was the only social space with the prospect of mobility.)
o “Weak” states
o Internal conflict
- There were two reasons Arab unity:
o To unite under a single Arab state, and
o To fight against Zionism.
- The Cold War
o USSR was allied with radical Arab states including Syria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).
o In the 1960s, the US formed an alliance with Israel.
o In the 1950s, West Germany was helping Israel and Israel received military support from the USSR.
- Wars in 1956 and 1967 dramatically changed the map and the conflict.
- Israel and the Arab states held irreconcilable positions from 1967-1973.
- In 1973 there was a shift in the conflict dynamic.
o Political solutions were now a possibility.
o Even the PLO was willing to engage in (limited) political negotiations.
- In 1972, Sadat threw out military advisors from the USSR signaling to the West that Egypt might be ready for negotiations.
The Camp David Accords (1978-1979)
- As a result of the accords, Israel returns the Sinai Desert to Egypt in exchange for peace/ recognition.
- An all out war becomes less likely between Israel and the Arab states.
- During the accords, Israel was confronted with the Palestinian refugee dilemma.
- Arab states were very angry with Egypt for its participation in the accords and Egypt was banned from the Arab League for 10 years.
- The most tricky issue: Israeli Prime Minister Begin had sworn an oath to God that he would not give up any territory to the Arabs.
- Carter persuaded Begin to allow the Knesset to vote about the issue.
- Carter was instrumental in the success of the accords.
Iran
- Iran also impacted the dynamics of the conflict.
- In 1979, Iran experienced revolution and the overthrow of the Shah.
- Iran was a cornerstone of US foreign policy after World War II.
- US and Israel had supported the ousted Shah.
Iraq
- The revolution in Iran threatened to spread to Iraq.
- Iran and Iraq went to war in 1980 over a border dispute.
o Saddam Hussein saw an opportunity to claim territory after the Islamic Revolution.
o Iraq was supplied and supported by the USSR, other Arab states, and the US.
o Iran was supplied and supported by North Korea, China, and Israel.
o The war resulted in 1.5 million casualties.
o An armistice was signed in 1988.
Palestine
- In 1967, the PLO was formed under the leadership of Yasser Arafat.
- The PLO was headquartered in Jordan until 1970. In October 1970, the PLO was expelled after it was viewed as a state within a state by the leadership of Jordan.
- After 1970, the PLO used Lebanon as a base.
- The PLO experienced internal conflict in 1983 and was split with Arafat and others moving to Tunis.
- In 1987, the first Palestinian Intifada (uprising) break out.
Key Questions
- How did the PLO and Israel become involved in the Lebanese civil war?
- What were the effects of the Lebanese civil war for the Arab-Israeli conflict?
- How does the emergence of Hezbollah alter PLO-Israeli relations?
- What was the intifada and what were its effects on the Arab-Israeli conflict?
Lebanon
- Lebanon did not attack Israel in 1948.
- Lebanon had problems with Syria who considered Lebanon as a part of Greater Syria.
- Lebanon was traditionally a refuge for Christians and others minorities who had been persecuted by Muslims.
- Tensions erupted briefly in the 1950s and dramatically in the 1970s.
- In 1975, civil war broke out.
o The PLO and Syria were involved.
- The PLO attacked Israel from southern Lebanon.
- In response to PLO attacks from across the Lebanese border, Israel participates in the civil war in support of the Christian militias with the added intent of destroying PLO bases.
- In response, a UN peacekeeping force is deployed but it is unsuccessful at restoring order.
Operation Peace for Galilee
- Israel invades Lebanon in June 1982 with four strategic goals:
o Kick out the PLO
o Scare the Syrians
o Create a separate peace agreement with the Christian president of Lebanon.
o Scare the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
- Israel was deeply divided over this war.
o According to Israeli myth, Israel had never before initiated a conflict.
o Demonstrations took place throughout Israel.
- Israel considered the PLO as a terrorist organization at this time.
- There was no recognition on each side.
- Fatah had shifted so much that it was now considering a two state solution.
- Links between Israel and the US tightened.
- Eventually the PLO withdrew from Lebanon and reestablished itself in Tunis, Tunisia.
Sabra and Shatila
- Lebanese-Christian militias slaughtered approximately 2,000 Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in Southern Lebanon.
o The attacks were initiated in response to an assassination of a Lebanese leader in Lebanon by the PLO.
o The IDF shouldered most of the blame for the slaughter and Ariel Sharon who was then commander of the IDF forces in Southern Lebanon was found morally responsible.
o Sharon was forced to resign over the incident.
- As a result of the massacre, the PLO was kicked out of Lebanon, Syria was scared, and internal divisions emerged in the PLO.
- Israel seemed victorious in its military operation in Lebanon until the Sabra and Shatila massacres when everything went wrong.
o International opinion turned against Israel.
o Hezbollah emerges as a new player and initiates devastating suicide-bomb attacks.
o 1/10th of the Israeli population began protesting in the streets of Israel.
- A unity government was established in Israel in 1984 in response to an election without a clear winner.
- It was generally agreed that Lebanon was a disaster.
How does the emergence of Hezbollah alter PLO-Israeli relations?
- Militant PLO members form Hezbollah, a more violent terrorist organization than the PLO.
- Arafat’s authority is reduced by distance--- he is now in Tunisia--- and competition.
- Arafat’s hand is forced: He must decide whether to ally with the more violent elements of the PLO or draw the olive branch closer.
- Arafat sought to repair breaks between PLO factions and was largely successful by spring 1987.
Peace Proposals
- In 1981, Reagan proposes limited autonomy for residents of the West Bank and Gaza.
- Saudi Arabia also offers a solution.
The First Intifada
- The First Intifada begins in December 1987.
- It is a spontaneous revolt.
- The Intifada was just what Arafat needed thus he claimed responsibility even though he was not responsible.
- Due to the Intifada, Arafat gained legitimacy in the Arab world again.
- The Intifada had a big impact on Israeli society in general and tourism in particular as tourists were now reluctant to visit the Holy Land.
- This was the first time a majority in Israeli society were willing to consider giving back the occupied territories.
- Israel recognized Arafat as the representative of the Palestinian people.
- A law was passed in Israel forbidding Israelis from speaking to the PLO thus frustrating negotiations.
- However, at this time, people from both sides started talking about solutions. Even high ranking military officers became involved.
- Despite the fact that at this time, many Palestinians viewed the PLO as their sole representative, Hamas was formed and challenged secular Palestinian nationalism.
Progression of the Intifada
- Palestinians engaged in protests, strikes, non-payment of taxes, and refusal to use identity documents.
- While the Intifada was largely non-violent, images of stone throwing youths became emblematic.
- PLO took over the movement, escalating violence to incidents involving firearms.
- By 1991, 697 Palestinians had been killed including 78 under the age of 14.
Madrid Conference, 1991
- This conference was both bilateral and multilateral.
- Unfortunately, the conference was unsuccessful, ending in deadlock.
- The Israeli Prime Minister did not want any members of the PLO to participate.
- The idea of Gaza first emerged. That is, Israel should first withdraw from the Gaza Strip.
- Jordan and Israel immediately agreed on a Declaration of Principles but Jordan could not sign anything until Syria had signed an agreement and Syria could not sign anything until the Palestinians had signed an agreement. Thus, deadlock.
- Meanwhile, Israeli society was changing due to immigration from the former Soviet Union.
- President Bush Sr. threatens to halt aid to Israel if settlements continue.
Background: The Arab League and a Changing Middle East
- The Arab League was formed for two reasons:
o It was a response to Zionism.
o It was a response to the creation of independent Arab states in the 1920s.
- Dramatic changes occurred in the Middle East in the 1950s.
o There were many coups and regime changes.
o Ethnic divisions became increasingly important.
o There was a build-up of military capacity (The military was the only social space with the prospect of mobility.)
o “Weak” states
o Internal conflict
- There were two reasons Arab unity:
o To unite under a single Arab state, and
o To fight against Zionism.
- The Cold War
o USSR was allied with radical Arab states including Syria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).
o In the 1960s, the US formed an alliance with Israel.
o In the 1950s, West Germany was helping Israel and Israel received military support from the USSR.
- Wars in 1956 and 1967 dramatically changed the map and the conflict.
- Israel and the Arab states held irreconcilable positions from 1967-1973.
- In 1973 there was a shift in the conflict dynamic.
o Political solutions were now a possibility.
o Even the PLO was willing to engage in (limited) political negotiations.
- In 1972, Sadat threw out military advisors from the USSR signaling to the West that Egypt might be ready for negotiations.
The Camp David Accords (1978-1979)
- As a result of the accords, Israel returns the Sinai Desert to Egypt in exchange for peace/ recognition.
- An all out war becomes less likely between Israel and the Arab states.
- During the accords, Israel was confronted with the Palestinian refugee dilemma.
- Arab states were very angry with Egypt for its participation in the accords and Egypt was banned from the Arab League for 10 years.
- The most tricky issue: Israeli Prime Minister Begin had sworn an oath to God that he would not give up any territory to the Arabs.
- Carter persuaded Begin to allow the Knesset to vote about the issue.
- Carter was instrumental in the success of the accords.
Iran
- Iran also impacted the dynamics of the conflict.
- In 1979, Iran experienced revolution and the overthrow of the Shah.
- Iran was a cornerstone of US foreign policy after World War II.
- US and Israel had supported the ousted Shah.
Iraq
- The revolution in Iran threatened to spread to Iraq.
- Iran and Iraq went to war in 1980 over a border dispute.
o Saddam Hussein saw an opportunity to claim territory after the Islamic Revolution.
o Iraq was supplied and supported by the USSR, other Arab states, and the US.
o Iran was supplied and supported by North Korea, China, and Israel.
o The war resulted in 1.5 million casualties.
o An armistice was signed in 1988.
Palestine
- In 1967, the PLO was formed under the leadership of Yasser Arafat.
- The PLO was headquartered in Jordan until 1970. In October 1970, the PLO was expelled after it was viewed as a state within a state by the leadership of Jordan.
- After 1970, the PLO used Lebanon as a base.
- The PLO experienced internal conflict in 1983 and was split with Arafat and others moving to Tunis.
- In 1987, the first Palestinian Intifada (uprising) break out.
Key Questions
- How did the PLO and Israel become involved in the Lebanese civil war?
- What were the effects of the Lebanese civil war for the Arab-Israeli conflict?
- How does the emergence of Hezbollah alter PLO-Israeli relations?
- What was the intifada and what were its effects on the Arab-Israeli conflict?
Lebanon
- Lebanon did not attack Israel in 1948.
- Lebanon had problems with Syria who considered Lebanon as a part of Greater Syria.
- Lebanon was traditionally a refuge for Christians and others minorities who had been persecuted by Muslims.
- Tensions erupted briefly in the 1950s and dramatically in the 1970s.
- In 1975, civil war broke out.
o The PLO and Syria were involved.
- The PLO attacked Israel from southern Lebanon.
- In response to PLO attacks from across the Lebanese border, Israel participates in the civil war in support of the Christian militias with the added intent of destroying PLO bases.
- In response, a UN peacekeeping force is deployed but it is unsuccessful at restoring order.
Operation Peace for Galilee
- Israel invades Lebanon in June 1982 with four strategic goals:
o Kick out the PLO
o Scare the Syrians
o Create a separate peace agreement with the Christian president of Lebanon.
o Scare the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
- Israel was deeply divided over this war.
o According to Israeli myth, Israel had never before initiated a conflict.
o Demonstrations took place throughout Israel.
- Israel considered the PLO as a terrorist organization at this time.
- There was no recognition on each side.
- Fatah had shifted so much that it was now considering a two state solution.
- Links between Israel and the US tightened.
- Eventually the PLO withdrew from Lebanon and reestablished itself in Tunis, Tunisia.
Sabra and Shatila
- Lebanese-Christian militias slaughtered approximately 2,000 Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila in Southern Lebanon.
o The attacks were initiated in response to an assassination of a Lebanese leader in Lebanon by the PLO.
o The IDF shouldered most of the blame for the slaughter and Ariel Sharon who was then commander of the IDF forces in Southern Lebanon was found morally responsible.
o Sharon was forced to resign over the incident.
- As a result of the massacre, the PLO was kicked out of Lebanon, Syria was scared, and internal divisions emerged in the PLO.
- Israel seemed victorious in its military operation in Lebanon until the Sabra and Shatila massacres when everything went wrong.
o International opinion turned against Israel.
o Hezbollah emerges as a new player and initiates devastating suicide-bomb attacks.
o 1/10th of the Israeli population began protesting in the streets of Israel.
- A unity government was established in Israel in 1984 in response to an election without a clear winner.
- It was generally agreed that Lebanon was a disaster.
How does the emergence of Hezbollah alter PLO-Israeli relations?
- Militant PLO members form Hezbollah, a more violent terrorist organization than the PLO.
- Arafat’s authority is reduced by distance--- he is now in Tunisia--- and competition.
- Arafat’s hand is forced: He must decide whether to ally with the more violent elements of the PLO or draw the olive branch closer.
- Arafat sought to repair breaks between PLO factions and was largely successful by spring 1987.
Peace Proposals
- In 1981, Reagan proposes limited autonomy for residents of the West Bank and Gaza.
- Saudi Arabia also offers a solution.
The First Intifada
- The First Intifada begins in December 1987.
- It is a spontaneous revolt.
- The Intifada was just what Arafat needed thus he claimed responsibility even though he was not responsible.
- Due to the Intifada, Arafat gained legitimacy in the Arab world again.
- The Intifada had a big impact on Israeli society in general and tourism in particular as tourists were now reluctant to visit the Holy Land.
- This was the first time a majority in Israeli society were willing to consider giving back the occupied territories.
- Israel recognized Arafat as the representative of the Palestinian people.
- A law was passed in Israel forbidding Israelis from speaking to the PLO thus frustrating negotiations.
- However, at this time, people from both sides started talking about solutions. Even high ranking military officers became involved.
- Despite the fact that at this time, many Palestinians viewed the PLO as their sole representative, Hamas was formed and challenged secular Palestinian nationalism.
Progression of the Intifada
- Palestinians engaged in protests, strikes, non-payment of taxes, and refusal to use identity documents.
- While the Intifada was largely non-violent, images of stone throwing youths became emblematic.
- PLO took over the movement, escalating violence to incidents involving firearms.
- By 1991, 697 Palestinians had been killed including 78 under the age of 14.
Madrid Conference, 1991
- This conference was both bilateral and multilateral.
- Unfortunately, the conference was unsuccessful, ending in deadlock.
- The Israeli Prime Minister did not want any members of the PLO to participate.
- The idea of Gaza first emerged. That is, Israel should first withdraw from the Gaza Strip.
- Jordan and Israel immediately agreed on a Declaration of Principles but Jordan could not sign anything until Syria had signed an agreement and Syria could not sign anything until the Palestinians had signed an agreement. Thus, deadlock.
- Meanwhile, Israeli society was changing due to immigration from the former Soviet Union.
- President Bush Sr. threatens to halt aid to Israel if settlements continue.
Lecture #5: Theory: Conflicts and 'Loss of Face'
Michael Schulz
What are our options in resolving a conflict?
The Conflict Triangle
- Galtung's Conflict Triangle which points to content/issus/contradiction; attitudes/stereotypes/imagery; and behavior/actions/violence.
- Attitudes/stereotypes/imagery are the principle problems in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The conflict staircase
- Mutual personal mistrust is prevalent in this conflict.
o The media plays an extremely important role here.
o The media’s bias is not surprising because it exists everywhere (including Sweden) but it plays an enormous role in socialization and the creation and perpetuation of stereotypes.
o Israelis are often proactive in the media while Palestinians are reactive.
- Schulz: This conflict ranges from stairs 4 (scurrilous images)-9 (total annihilation) on the conflict staircase but most people are at stairs 4 (scurrilous images)-6 (strategical threats).
- Some describe the participants as members of honor-based societies that must revenge ‘loss of face.’
- Of course, there are always involved parties that have attempted to climb the conflict staircase in the opposite direction.
o Example- Israeli parents of children who died in a suicide attack who visit Palestinian parents of the suicide bomber.
- In the 1980s and 1990s, Israeli society was deeply divided over peace and conflict.
- Unfortunately, movement up the staircase is quite rare.
Iconic Images of Conflict
-It is impossible to be impartial in this conflict.
- Muhammad al Dura and his father die in Israeli/Palestinian crossfire. Images of their death were used to mobilize Palestinians during the 2nd Intifada.
- 2 Israelis are killed in Ramallah police station. Images of their death and the treatment of their bodies were used as evidence of Palestinian violence and brutality.
- Palestinian humiliation at checkpoints
- Arab suicide bombing
- The 1972 Munich Olympics
- These images create fear on both sides and make it difficult to seek and secure peace.
- Maps are also used as images to incite fear and conflict.
- Images of the 1973 October War have traumatized Israeli society.
o Prior to the war, Israelis were very afraid that the Arab states would invade and “throw them into the sea.”
o Meanwhile, the military was certain that they would achieve victory.
o After 1973, many Israelis believed that they were at risk. The Arab states were thought to be a greater threat than Palestinians. Today, Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran are still viewed as huge threats.
- Enemy images and stereotypes are so deeply ingrained that they seem irreversible.
The Path to Reconciliation?
- Key questions: How can Israelis and Palestinians move from a divided past to a shared future? / How do we achieve mercy, justice, truth, peace, etc.?
- For Israelis, this conflict is about the security of individual Israeli citizens and the state of Israel.
- For Palestinians, this conflict is about justice, rights, and identity.
What is Mercy?
- Schulz: at the moment, the right of return is the biggest obstacle to peace.
- How can the Palestinians forgive “expulsion”?
- How can the Israelis forgive “terrorism”?
What is Justice?
- How is justice defined?
- Should justice be defined contextually?
- How do you bring “terrorists”/ leaders to court?
- Can tradition forms of justice be applied?
How can we approach “the truth”?
- How do you reverse socialized stereotypes?
- How do you understand the perpetrator?
- How can history be written in a fair and balanced way?
- How do you teach history to children?
- How do you objectively approach a painful past?
How can we approach conflict resolution?
- How do you restore justice to Palestinians and security to Israelis (simultaneously)?
- How do you approach the following incompatibilities: refugees, settlers, borders, water, citizens’ rights?
- How care you restore trust?
- How can we approach a long-term time-frame for peace-building?
Components of Reconciliation
- Non-violence
- Equal partnership (This conflict is extremely asymmetric.)
- Recognition of the legitimate existence of the rival group
- Societal beliefs about Peace
- Unfortunately, Palestinians who develop relationships with Israelis may put themselves in danger.
Is Forgiveness Necessary?
- Are some deeds unforgiveable?
Methods of Reconciliation
- Apology
- Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
- Writing a common history
- Education
- Mass media
- Joint Projects
- Tourism
- Cultural exchanges
- NGO projects
- Publicized meetings between representatives of both groups
Unfortunately, leaders in this conflict have never apologized to each other.
What are our options in resolving a conflict?
The Conflict Triangle
- Galtung's Conflict Triangle which points to content/issus/contradiction; attitudes/stereotypes/imagery; and behavior/actions/violence.
- Attitudes/stereotypes/imagery are the principle problems in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The conflict staircase
- Mutual personal mistrust is prevalent in this conflict.
o The media plays an extremely important role here.
o The media’s bias is not surprising because it exists everywhere (including Sweden) but it plays an enormous role in socialization and the creation and perpetuation of stereotypes.
o Israelis are often proactive in the media while Palestinians are reactive.
- Schulz: This conflict ranges from stairs 4 (scurrilous images)-9 (total annihilation) on the conflict staircase but most people are at stairs 4 (scurrilous images)-6 (strategical threats).
- Some describe the participants as members of honor-based societies that must revenge ‘loss of face.’
- Of course, there are always involved parties that have attempted to climb the conflict staircase in the opposite direction.
o Example- Israeli parents of children who died in a suicide attack who visit Palestinian parents of the suicide bomber.
- In the 1980s and 1990s, Israeli society was deeply divided over peace and conflict.
- Unfortunately, movement up the staircase is quite rare.
Iconic Images of Conflict
-It is impossible to be impartial in this conflict.
- Muhammad al Dura and his father die in Israeli/Palestinian crossfire. Images of their death were used to mobilize Palestinians during the 2nd Intifada.
- 2 Israelis are killed in Ramallah police station. Images of their death and the treatment of their bodies were used as evidence of Palestinian violence and brutality.
- Palestinian humiliation at checkpoints
- Arab suicide bombing
- The 1972 Munich Olympics
- These images create fear on both sides and make it difficult to seek and secure peace.
- Maps are also used as images to incite fear and conflict.
- Images of the 1973 October War have traumatized Israeli society.
o Prior to the war, Israelis were very afraid that the Arab states would invade and “throw them into the sea.”
o Meanwhile, the military was certain that they would achieve victory.
o After 1973, many Israelis believed that they were at risk. The Arab states were thought to be a greater threat than Palestinians. Today, Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran are still viewed as huge threats.
- Enemy images and stereotypes are so deeply ingrained that they seem irreversible.
The Path to Reconciliation?
- Key questions: How can Israelis and Palestinians move from a divided past to a shared future? / How do we achieve mercy, justice, truth, peace, etc.?
- For Israelis, this conflict is about the security of individual Israeli citizens and the state of Israel.
- For Palestinians, this conflict is about justice, rights, and identity.
What is Mercy?
- Schulz: at the moment, the right of return is the biggest obstacle to peace.
- How can the Palestinians forgive “expulsion”?
- How can the Israelis forgive “terrorism”?
What is Justice?
- How is justice defined?
- Should justice be defined contextually?
- How do you bring “terrorists”/ leaders to court?
- Can tradition forms of justice be applied?
How can we approach “the truth”?
- How do you reverse socialized stereotypes?
- How do you understand the perpetrator?
- How can history be written in a fair and balanced way?
- How do you teach history to children?
- How do you objectively approach a painful past?
How can we approach conflict resolution?
- How do you restore justice to Palestinians and security to Israelis (simultaneously)?
- How do you approach the following incompatibilities: refugees, settlers, borders, water, citizens’ rights?
- How care you restore trust?
- How can we approach a long-term time-frame for peace-building?
Components of Reconciliation
- Non-violence
- Equal partnership (This conflict is extremely asymmetric.)
- Recognition of the legitimate existence of the rival group
- Societal beliefs about Peace
- Unfortunately, Palestinians who develop relationships with Israelis may put themselves in danger.
Is Forgiveness Necessary?
- Are some deeds unforgiveable?
Methods of Reconciliation
- Apology
- Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
- Writing a common history
- Education
- Mass media
- Joint Projects
- Tourism
- Cultural exchanges
- NGO projects
- Publicized meetings between representatives of both groups
Unfortunately, leaders in this conflict have never apologized to each other.
Lecture #4: Changing Winds, 1967-1979
Isabell Schierenbeck
A Changing Political Context
- After the June War/ Six Day War in June 1967, the Israeli occupation begins.
- Israel offers to exchange land for peace and recognition from the Arab states.
- Khartoum Resolution (The 3 No’s)- The Arab League meets in Khartoum, Sudan and passes the Khartoum Resolution which asserts that Arab states will not recognize Israel, negotiate with Israel, or make peace with Israel.
- The narrative changes as the conflict is transformed from the Arab-Israeli conflict to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.
- The October War/ Yom Kippur War occurs in 1973 taking the IDF by surprise and inflicting a high number of Israeli military casualties.
- The Camp David Accords are signed in 1979. Egypt breaks with the Khartoum Resolution and trades peace and recognition with Israel for the Sinai Desert.
- 1967 was a major turning point in the conflict, begging the question: What should Israel do with the Occupied Territories (the Sinai Desert, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank)?
Before 1967
- Did Israel plan to take over/ occupy the West Bank and Gaza Strip prior to 1967?
- Herut (later Likud) argued that Israel should occupy the West Bank and Gaza Strip for security reasons as well as a religious right to ‘Greater Israel’ possessed by the Jews.
- Rabi Kook was instrumental to spreading ideological/religious reasons for claiming the West Bank.
After 1967
- The ultra-orthodox Zionist movement was born after the Six-Day War as they were suddenly politicized.
- 1967-1970: Labor-Likud unity government.
- After 1970: Likud became Labor’s biggest rival which was a major turning point since Labor were in charge of the government from 1948-1967.
- The dispute that caused the political shift: Did Labor really want to give the Occupied Territories back? Who initiated the settlements?
The October War/ Yom Kippur War, 1973
- This blow was the fatal blow to the Labor Party.
- After the war, Prime Minister Golda Meir takes the blame for Israel’s losses in the war and resigns.
- Israel was surprised by the Arab attack and initially suffered heavy casualties.
- Likud basically says, “I told you so!”
- Israeli politics shifts to the right.
- This was interpreted as the 2nd sign of the return of the Messiah by ultra-orthodox Zionists--- Israel’s resounding victory in the Six-Day War was seen as the 1st sign of the Messiah’s return.
- Gush Emunim (the Block of the Faithful) is founded in 1974.
The Camp David Accords, 1978-1979
- The accords were backed by American financial assistance.
- Carter, Begin, and Sadat meet at Camp David to trade land for peace.
- Palestinians start representing themselves and put themselves on the political map.
- The Camp David Accords consisted of three parts:
o Israel returned the Sinai Desert to Egypt.
o Israel accepts UN resolution 242, granting autonomous authority to the West Bank and Gaza.
o Israeli/Arab statement of principles.
- The exchange of land for peace was perhaps the most important outcome of these negotiations.
- Although the Sinai Desert was returned to Egypt, it had no mythical meaning/significance to Israelis. (This is why many contend that it would be much easier to give back Gaza than the West Bank.)
What are the disputed “facts”?
- Israeli war aims
- Arab war aims
- Israeli settlement Policy
Israeli Politics
- Gaza and the West Bank are not considered to be a part of the state of Israel because they have not been annexed. In contrast, the Knesset officially annexed the Golan Heights and Jerusalem.
- Israeli society contains many cleavages.
o A cleavage is a social division creating a collective identity among those to each side of the divide. This identity competes with the ‘national identity’ (Lipset & Robban 1967).
- There are several cleavages in Israeli politics:
o Jews- Palestinians
o Ashkenazim- Mizrachim
o Religious- Secular
o Sabra (those born in Israel)- Immigrants
o Left- Right
Jews- Palestinians
- Jews constitute the majority in Israel while Israeli-Palestinians, Palestinian-Israelis, or Israeli Arabs constitute the minority.
- The Israeli Arabs are those who stayed behind in 1948-1949 and their decedents. They are religiously either Muslim or Christian (or secular) and ethnically either Palestinians, Druze, or Beguin.
- Israeli Arabs primarily live in the Galilee and the Negev Desert.
- Israeli Arabs living outside of Jerusalem have full citizenship while those living in East Jerusalem have residency.
- However, there are social divisions between Israelis and Israeli Arabs including socioeconomic status, living conditions, education, ability to work and serve in the military, birth rates, and the position of women.
- There are also internal cleavages including religion, class, and family.
Isabell said that she would continue this lecture on Friday, April 23, 2010 when she will discuss “Israeli Society.”
A Changing Political Context
- After the June War/ Six Day War in June 1967, the Israeli occupation begins.
- Israel offers to exchange land for peace and recognition from the Arab states.
- Khartoum Resolution (The 3 No’s)- The Arab League meets in Khartoum, Sudan and passes the Khartoum Resolution which asserts that Arab states will not recognize Israel, negotiate with Israel, or make peace with Israel.
- The narrative changes as the conflict is transformed from the Arab-Israeli conflict to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.
- The October War/ Yom Kippur War occurs in 1973 taking the IDF by surprise and inflicting a high number of Israeli military casualties.
- The Camp David Accords are signed in 1979. Egypt breaks with the Khartoum Resolution and trades peace and recognition with Israel for the Sinai Desert.
- 1967 was a major turning point in the conflict, begging the question: What should Israel do with the Occupied Territories (the Sinai Desert, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank)?
Before 1967
- Did Israel plan to take over/ occupy the West Bank and Gaza Strip prior to 1967?
- Herut (later Likud) argued that Israel should occupy the West Bank and Gaza Strip for security reasons as well as a religious right to ‘Greater Israel’ possessed by the Jews.
- Rabi Kook was instrumental to spreading ideological/religious reasons for claiming the West Bank.
After 1967
- The ultra-orthodox Zionist movement was born after the Six-Day War as they were suddenly politicized.
- 1967-1970: Labor-Likud unity government.
- After 1970: Likud became Labor’s biggest rival which was a major turning point since Labor were in charge of the government from 1948-1967.
- The dispute that caused the political shift: Did Labor really want to give the Occupied Territories back? Who initiated the settlements?
The October War/ Yom Kippur War, 1973
- This blow was the fatal blow to the Labor Party.
- After the war, Prime Minister Golda Meir takes the blame for Israel’s losses in the war and resigns.
- Israel was surprised by the Arab attack and initially suffered heavy casualties.
- Likud basically says, “I told you so!”
- Israeli politics shifts to the right.
- This was interpreted as the 2nd sign of the return of the Messiah by ultra-orthodox Zionists--- Israel’s resounding victory in the Six-Day War was seen as the 1st sign of the Messiah’s return.
- Gush Emunim (the Block of the Faithful) is founded in 1974.
The Camp David Accords, 1978-1979
- The accords were backed by American financial assistance.
- Carter, Begin, and Sadat meet at Camp David to trade land for peace.
- Palestinians start representing themselves and put themselves on the political map.
- The Camp David Accords consisted of three parts:
o Israel returned the Sinai Desert to Egypt.
o Israel accepts UN resolution 242, granting autonomous authority to the West Bank and Gaza.
o Israeli/Arab statement of principles.
- The exchange of land for peace was perhaps the most important outcome of these negotiations.
- Although the Sinai Desert was returned to Egypt, it had no mythical meaning/significance to Israelis. (This is why many contend that it would be much easier to give back Gaza than the West Bank.)
What are the disputed “facts”?
- Israeli war aims
- Arab war aims
- Israeli settlement Policy
Israeli Politics
- Gaza and the West Bank are not considered to be a part of the state of Israel because they have not been annexed. In contrast, the Knesset officially annexed the Golan Heights and Jerusalem.
- Israeli society contains many cleavages.
o A cleavage is a social division creating a collective identity among those to each side of the divide. This identity competes with the ‘national identity’ (Lipset & Robban 1967).
- There are several cleavages in Israeli politics:
o Jews- Palestinians
o Ashkenazim- Mizrachim
o Religious- Secular
o Sabra (those born in Israel)- Immigrants
o Left- Right
Jews- Palestinians
- Jews constitute the majority in Israel while Israeli-Palestinians, Palestinian-Israelis, or Israeli Arabs constitute the minority.
- The Israeli Arabs are those who stayed behind in 1948-1949 and their decedents. They are religiously either Muslim or Christian (or secular) and ethnically either Palestinians, Druze, or Beguin.
- Israeli Arabs primarily live in the Galilee and the Negev Desert.
- Israeli Arabs living outside of Jerusalem have full citizenship while those living in East Jerusalem have residency.
- However, there are social divisions between Israelis and Israeli Arabs including socioeconomic status, living conditions, education, ability to work and serve in the military, birth rates, and the position of women.
- There are also internal cleavages including religion, class, and family.
Isabell said that she would continue this lecture on Friday, April 23, 2010 when she will discuss “Israeli Society.”
Lecture #3: Nationbuilding and the Arab-Israeli Wars
Isabell Schierenbeck, Department of Political Science
Please see powepoints entitled State- and Nation Building and the Arab-Israeli Wars.ppt and Masada.ppt at
http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
What is nationalism?
- Nationalism is an ideological movement for autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population constituting a nation.
- Examples of national movements include Jewish/ Zionist, Palestinian, Kurdish, and Scottish.
- A nation state consists of one nation occupying a single territory.
- According to French historian Renan, "Getting history wrong is part of being a nation."
National myths
-National myths inspire belief and action amoung their adherents.
-A conflict cannot be resolve without knowledge of a nation's national myths.
- An important Jewish national myth revolves around Masada.
- A common bumper sticker in Israel reads, "Masada shall not fall again!" This slogan means we (the Jewish people) will never give up.
Zionism
-Zionism is a Jewish national movement.
- Early Zionists believed that the establishment of a Jewsih homeland was necessary because of widespread anti-Semitism.
- Palestine was not always seen as the only Jewish homeland but was eventually lifted up to add strength to the cause.
- However, there were internal disputes among Jews and Zionists.
-Aliyah or ascent is Jewish immigration to Eretz Yisrael.
- The Yishuv was the Jewish nation-building institution that exists in Palestine prior to the creation of the state of Israel.
Palestinian Nationbuilding
- Palestinian nationalism was a response to Jewish nationalism via immigration and settlement in Palestine.
- The strength of Zionism soon made it clear that an Arab identity or a Syrian identity was not useful for Palestinians.
- Zionism was a problem that no other Arab population in the Middle East face thus Palestinians had to create an independent national movement to assert their rights and claim their homeland.
- Palestinian identity is founded on territory and purification of culture.
- The first Palestinian resistance movement is called the Great Revolt and occured in Palestine from 1936-1939.
- During the Great Revolt, many Palestinian leaders were killed thus the Palestinian national movement was unable to recover by 1948 to challenge the formation of the state of Israel in Palestine.
Disputed "Facts"
1. Military balance (organization. equipment?)
2. The origin of the Palestinian refugee problem (Arab propaganda or Israeli violence/ harassment?)
3. Israeli-Jordian relations (agreement in 1946-1947?)
4. Arab war aims ("Throw the Jews into the sea"?)
5. The elusive peace (Arab/ Israeli peace initiatives?)
6. Israeli war aims (Was Plan Dalet a "master plan" for the transfer of the Palestinians?)
Please see powepoints entitled State- and Nation Building and the Arab-Israeli Wars.ppt and Masada.ppt at
http://kursportal.student.gu.se/inst/S2GLS%7C_%7CNONE/RS2235/filuppladdning/browse2.php?dir=Kursmoment%2FLecture+notes+and+ppt
What is nationalism?
- Nationalism is an ideological movement for autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population constituting a nation.
- Examples of national movements include Jewish/ Zionist, Palestinian, Kurdish, and Scottish.
- A nation state consists of one nation occupying a single territory.
- According to French historian Renan, "Getting history wrong is part of being a nation."
National myths
-National myths inspire belief and action amoung their adherents.
-A conflict cannot be resolve without knowledge of a nation's national myths.
- An important Jewish national myth revolves around Masada.
- A common bumper sticker in Israel reads, "Masada shall not fall again!" This slogan means we (the Jewish people) will never give up.
Zionism
-Zionism is a Jewish national movement.
- Early Zionists believed that the establishment of a Jewsih homeland was necessary because of widespread anti-Semitism.
- Palestine was not always seen as the only Jewish homeland but was eventually lifted up to add strength to the cause.
- However, there were internal disputes among Jews and Zionists.
-Aliyah or ascent is Jewish immigration to Eretz Yisrael.
- The Yishuv was the Jewish nation-building institution that exists in Palestine prior to the creation of the state of Israel.
Palestinian Nationbuilding
- Palestinian nationalism was a response to Jewish nationalism via immigration and settlement in Palestine.
- The strength of Zionism soon made it clear that an Arab identity or a Syrian identity was not useful for Palestinians.
- Zionism was a problem that no other Arab population in the Middle East face thus Palestinians had to create an independent national movement to assert their rights and claim their homeland.
- Palestinian identity is founded on territory and purification of culture.
- The first Palestinian resistance movement is called the Great Revolt and occured in Palestine from 1936-1939.
- During the Great Revolt, many Palestinian leaders were killed thus the Palestinian national movement was unable to recover by 1948 to challenge the formation of the state of Israel in Palestine.
Disputed "Facts"
1. Military balance (organization. equipment?)
2. The origin of the Palestinian refugee problem (Arab propaganda or Israeli violence/ harassment?)
3. Israeli-Jordian relations (agreement in 1946-1947?)
4. Arab war aims ("Throw the Jews into the sea"?)
5. The elusive peace (Arab/ Israeli peace initiatives?)
6. Israeli war aims (Was Plan Dalet a "master plan" for the transfer of the Palestinians?)
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